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Lessons from Stockholm: Evaluating the Global
Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants
ANDREW J. YODER*
INTRODUCTION
On May 22, 2001, representatives from over 120 countries signed a new
treaty in Stockholm, Sweden, regulating the "dirty dozen" persistent organic
pollutants (POPs)-some of the most dangerous chemicals in the world.) POPs
are hardy, toxic chemicals that persist in the environment, wreaking biological
havoc in animals and people, to an extent not yet completely understood by sci-
entists. The Stockholm Convention-the first global agreement to seek to ban
an entire class of chemicals because of their effects on human health-calls for
immediate or long-term elimination of twelve highly toxic chemicals, including
PCBs, DDT, and dioxins.2 This treaty promises to be one of the main environ-
mental achievements in the decade following the 1992 Rio Earth Summit, artic-
ulating principles for a less toxic world, including release prevention, reduction
of toxic stockpiles, use of less-dangerous substitutes, and the need for precaution
in dealing with toxics generally.3 The POPs Convention also takes a proactive
approach to toxics management, focusing on elimination of pesticides and other
POPs at their source, rather than through "end-of-the-pipe" controls frequently
employed by other environmental statutes and treaties. Particularly remarkable
is the broad support the treaty has enjoyed among governments, public health
officials, environmentalists, and affected industries.
The success of the POPs negotiations, especially in light of the strong debate
over certain portions of the treaty text, is encouraging and promises success for
* J.D.IM.PA candidate, Indiana University School of Law and School of Public & Environ-
mental Affairs, 2004. I wish to express my gratitude to John Applegate and Glen Wiser for their
inspiration and support in the writing of this Note. Further, I would like to warmly thank Morag
Carter, Richard A. Liroff, Anne Platt McGinn, and Cynthia Palmer Olsen for their patient advice
and thoughtful comments throughout the processes of drafting and revision.
1. Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants, May 22, 2001, 40 I.L.M. 532
[Stockholm Convention or POPs Convention].
2. See International POPs Elimination Network (IPEN), POPs: The Birth of a Public Health
Treaty, at http//www.ipen.org.
3. Anne Platt McGinn, Reducing Our Toxic Burden, in STATE OF THE WORLD 2002, at 75 (2002).
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the regime at the implementation stage. The way that negotiators resolved their
differences and reached consensus at Stockholm holds lessons not only for
future toxics treaties, but also for multilateral environmental agreements
(MEAs) generally. This paper focuses on the story of the POPs negotiations, the
treaty they generated, and the lessons that can be learned from that experience.
In Part II, I present the problem of persistent organic pollutants, discussing their
global impacts on human and animal health, particularly on women and young
children. In Part III, I discuss the growth of international concern over POPs,
spurred by research into endocrine disruption and other health effects, and the
way that this awareness developed into a mandate to construct a global POPs
treaty. In Part IV, I discuss tensions inherent in environmental treaty negotia-
tions, examine the negotiating stages of the POPs treaty process, and highlight
important debates between participants. In Part V, I examine factors that sug-
gest the likely success of the POPs treaty, focusing on aspects of the negotiation
process that apply broadly in other global, environmental contexts, and conclude
that the Stockholm Convention teaches important lessons about effective envi-
ronmental treaty development.
I. THE EMERGING PROBLEM OF PERSISTENT ORGANIC POLLUTANTS
Scientists have been concerned about the effects of persistent organic pollut-
ants for many years. After World War II, Americans became concerned over in-
creased domestic pesticide use, the extremely toxic nature of these chemicals,
and the scale on which they were being used.4 In 1962, Rachel Carson gave shape
and substance to these apprehensions with Silent Spring,5 an early call to heed the
effects of synthetic pesticides. Employing a style that would typify environmen-
tal advocacy for years to come, Carson told a story of a countryside silenced by
invisible, poisonous pesticides, providing the impetus for much of the environ-
mental legislation enacted in the 1970s. 6 This influential story instilled aware-
ness and galvanized public opinion in the United States7 through graphic
4. JOHN S. APPLEGATE ET AL., REGULATION OF Toxic SUBSTANCES AND HAZARDOUS WASTES 527
(2000).
5. RACHEL CARSON, SILENT SPRING (1962).
6. JOHN HARTE ET AL., Toxrcs A TO Z: A GUIDE TO EVERYDAY POLLUTION HAZARDS 114 (1991).
7. Silent Spring has been voted the most influential book of the past fifty years. Marilyn Gold-
stein,A Literature of Warning, NEWSDAY, July 27, 1992, at 8.
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descriptions of DDT's effects upon birds of prey,8 and eventually led the federal
government to ban domestic use of the pesticide.9
During this era, accumulation of toxic substances in the Great Lakes aquatic
system and negative health impacts in wildlife species brought the subject home
for many Americans who had been skeptical of Carson's strong warnings.' °
Officials in the first Bush Administration soon came to understand the funda-
mental danger posed by the levels of toxic exposure experienced by Americans."
Great Lakes residents began to believe that they were being exposed to higher
levels of toxic chemicals than people in other regions of the country, as they wit-
nessed the damage wrought by accumulation of toxic chemicals. 2 Throughout
this period, discoveries that other chemicals once considered safe-such as poly-
chlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) and chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs)-could be
deadly to humans prompted American policymakers to enact several statutes
banning or severely restricting the use of these substances as well. 3
Pesticide poisonings in South and Central America put the international
community on alert about synthetic chemicals, and raised the specter of concern
8. Richard L. Williamson et al., Gathering Danger: The Urgent Need to Regulate Toxic Sub-
stances That Can Bioaccumulate, 20 ECOLOGY L.Q. 605, 640-41 (1993).
9. Id. at 640-41. In 1969, the U.S. Department of Agriculture proposed cancellation of certain
uses of DDT. 34 Fed. Reg. 18,827 (1969). After acquiring jurisdiction, the newly formed Environ-
mental Protection Agency (EPA) cancelled most of the remaining registered uses for DDT, and
Administer Ruckelshaus affirmed this cancellation in 1972. 37 Fed. Reg. 13,369 (1972).
10. Peter L. Lallas, The Role of Process and Participation in the Development of Effective Interna-
tional Environmental Agreements: A Study of the Global Treaty on Persistent Organic Pollutants
(POPS), 19 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 83, 90 (2000).
11. See GORDON K. DURNIL, THE MAKING OF A CONSERVATIVE ENVIRONMENTALIST (1995). As a
Bush appointee to the U.S.-Canada International Joint Committee for Water Quality, Durnil as-
sessed scientific evidence of Great Lakes contamination and interviews with thousands of individ-
uals and determined that toxic chemicals indeed posed a significant threat to human health,
compiling his findings in a book: "consequences to humans and their children cannot even be pre-
dicted. However, the increased risks of cancer to the exposed adult and, more worrisome, the
effects on the unborn progeny of the exposed, are frightening." Id. at 86.
12. THEO COLBORN ET AL., OUR STOLEN FUTURE: ARE WE THREATENING OUR FERTILITY, INTELLI-
GENCE, AND SURVIVAL? -A SCIENTIFIC DETECTIVE STORY 15 (1996). As the authors recount, concern
over the Great Lakes region escalated further in 1969 when the Cuyahoga River caught fire, Lake
Erie was pronounced "dead," and scientists judged that other lakes were also seriously endan-
gered. Id. at 13-14.
13. Lallas, supra note 10, at 90; see also, e.g., Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA), 15 U.S.C.A.
§ 2605(e) (2000).
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over pesticides used in agriculture. 4 In 1984, the release in Bhopal, India, of a
cloud of deadly pesticide gas (methyl isocyanate) killed thousands, and inspired
international appreciation for the dangers associated with pesticides) 5
With the increase in international trade, appreciation of the dangers of pesti-
cides became more acute in the United States because of the pesticide "circle of
poison."' 6 The circle of poison refers to the observed cycle whereby pesticides that
have been banned domestically are exported to other countries and applied to ag-
ricultural export crops.' 7 Often the countries importing the pesticides are develop-
ing nations, where problems arise due to unsafe handling and storage practices, as
well as improper labeling. 8 When regulating countries, such as the United States,
then import the pesticide-bearing crops, the circle is complete, and consumers in
these developed countries risk exposure to the invisible poisons, despite domestic
laws written to protect them. 9 Thus, the circle of poison highlights the need for
international controls on pesticides, POPs, and other toxic chemicals.
POPs are hazardous and potentially life-threatening organic compounds,
whose designation comes from their chemical characteristics. POPs are difficult
to break down, since they resist photolytic, chemical, and biological degrada-
tion."° As a result, POPs persist in the environment, and would continue to pol-
lute the earth for many years to come, even if releases were to cease
14. DAVID WEIR & MARK SCHAPIRO, CIRCLE OF POISON: PESTICIDES AND PEOPLE IN A HUNGRY
WORLD 11-14 (1981) (citing CENTRAL AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF INVESTIGATION AND INDUSTRIAL
TECHNOLOGY (ICAITI), AN ENVIRONMENTAL AND ECONOMIC STUDY OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF PES-
TICIDE USE IN CENTRAL AMERICAN COTTON PRODUCTION: FINAL REPORT, 97-98 (1977)). During the
period from 1972 to 1975, more than 14,000 poisonings and many deaths from pesticides were re-
corded on cotton plantations in Central America, due to indiscriminate use and application of pes-
ticides, often while workers toiled in the field. Id.
15. HARTE ET AL., supra note 6, at 190.
16. See generally WEIR & SCHAPIRO, supra note 14. See also HILARY FRENCH, VANISHING BORDERS:
PROTECTING THE PLANET IN THE AGE OF GLOBALIZATION, 76-81 (2000).
17. Richard W. Emory, Jr., Probing the Protections in the Rotterdam Convention on Prior Informed
Consent, 11 CoLo. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 47 n.4 (2001); see also Circle of Poison: Impact of U.S.
Pesticides on Third World Workers: Hearing Before the Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nu-
trition, and Forestry, 102d Cong. 1-2 (1991) (describing a specific example of litigation involving
the DBCP).
18. See Lallas, supra note 10, at 100.
19. For an extended discussion,see FRENCH,SUpra note 16, at 76-81.
20. Christina S. Chen, Comment, Persistent Organic Pollutants: Regime Formation and Norm
Selection, 13 CONN. J. INT'L L. 119 (1998).
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immediately.2' POPs also accumulate in the fatty tissues of living beings, due to
their persistence, low water solubility, and high lipid solubility.22 As a result,
POPs tend to biomagnify in food systems, accumulating in high levels in organ-
isms at the top of the food chain, rendering them the most susceptible to poten-
tial adverse health effects.23 Today, POPs are ubiquitous; scientists have found
them in measurable levels in living organisms,24 including in human blood and
breast milk, across the globe.2 POPs' persistence and their volatility also allow
them to move around the world, transported by both air and water currents.26
The "grasshopper effect," whereby POPs move in hopping fashion due to vari-
ations in climate and temperature,27 has allowed POPs to reach areas in the high
21. MICHELLE ALLSOPP ET AL., THE Tip OF THE ICEBERG: STATE OF KNOWLEDGE ON PERSISTENT
ORGANIC POLLUTANTS IN EUROPE AND THE ARCTIC 2 (1999).
22. Id.; see also Final Report of the IFCS Ad Hoc Working Group on Persistent Organic Pollutants,
Intergovernmental Forum on Chemical Safety (IFCS) 2 (1996), at http://irptc.unep.ch/pops/in-
dxhtms/ manwgrp.html.
23. See Chen, supra note 20, at 120. "The terms bioaccumulation, bioconcentration, and biomag-
nification all denote processes that concentrate a chemical substance in living tissues" as it moves
up the food chain. Williamson, et al,supra note 8, at 609. For more background on scientific find-
ings related to POPs, see United Nations, ECE Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air
Pollution (LRTAP), Ad Hoc Preparatory Working Group on Persistent Organic Pollutants,
Meeting Paper on Task VIII: Additional Information Concerning Significant Developments
Since the Completion of the 1994 Report of the Former Task Force on Persistent Organic Pollut-
ants (1995) [hereinafter LRTAP Working Group].
24. Kristin S. Schafer et al., Nowhere to Hide: Persistent Toxic Chemicals in the U.S. Food Supply,
Pesticide Action Network North America/Commonweal 9 (2001).
25. See Center for Health and Environmental Justice & Health Without Harm, A Comprehen-
sive List of Studies of Human Contaminants (2000), at http//www.ntec.org/superfund/contam.html.
26. L. Ritter et al., An Assessment Report on Persistent Organic Pollutants (1995), available at http:/
/irptc.unep.ch/pops (a joint undertaking of the Inter-Organization Programme on the Sound
Management of Chemicals (IOMC), the International Programme on Chemical Safety (IPCS),
and the Intergovernmental Forum on Chemical Safety (IFCS), assessing the "dirty dozen" POPs
and consolidating existing information on the relevant chemistry and toxicology, transport and
disposition, and availability and costs of substitutes to these substances).
27. Lallas, supra note 10, at 96; see also Arctic Pollution Issues: A State of the Arctic Environment
Report, Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Project (AMAP) (1997), at http://www.amap.no/
assess/soaer-cn [hereinafter AMAP Report]; CoLBORN ET AL.,supra note 12, at 87-110 (describing
the process by which PCBs and other POPs move through the global environment). See generally
Frank Wania & Donald Mackay, Tracking the Distribution of Persistent Organic Pollutants, 30
ENVTL. Sc. & TECH. 390 (1996) (explaining that effective control of POPs requires an understand-
ing of their migration processes).
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Arctic, far away from any industrial application.28 As a result, even indigenous
peoples of the Arctic face exposure to these chemicals in amounts that exceed tol-
erable intake levels.29
The pervasiveness of POPs in the global environment would not be so trou-
bling were it not for their danger to human and animal life and their persistence
in living organisms. Nine of the twelve POPs identified by the U.N. Environmen-
tal Programme (UNEP) for regulation are pesticides, including aldrin, dieldrin,
DDT, endrin, chlordane, hexachlorobenzene (HCB)," mirex, toxaphene, and
heptachlor.3 Many of these substances are widely recognized as so dangerous that
little debate is heard about the need to prohibit or virtually eliminate them.32 The
two other categories of POPs, industrial chemicals and industrial byproducts,
consist of PCBs and HCBs, and dioxins and furans, respectively." These chemi-
cals are also known to be toxic to humans at extremely low levels.34 In general, the
"dirty dozen" POPs are acutely or chronically toxic, or are classified as known or
probable human carcinogens."5 POPs are also linked to the learning, developmen-
tal, and behavioral disabilities that afflict children.36
28. See generally AMAP Report, supra note 27 (reporting the discovery of POPs in the high
Artic in levels that can only be explained by transport from lower latitudes).
29. Id., Executive Summary § 3.3.
30. Originally used as a fungicide for seed grain, HCB is produced during the manufacture of
chlorinated solvents, other chlorinated compounds, and several pesticides; as such, it falls between
the categories of POPs. ALLSOPP ET AL., supra note 21, at 3, Box 1.1.
31. PERSISTENT ORGANIC POLLUTANTS: SOCIOECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS FOR GLOBAL ACTION 2-3
(IFCS ed., 1996), available at http://irptc.unep.ch/pops/indxhtms/manpops2.html [hereinafter
SOCIOECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS FOR GLOBAL ACTION].
32. Don Mayer, The Precautionary Principle and International Efforts to Ban DDT, 9 S.C. ENVTL. L.J.
135, 144 (2002) (citing DURNIL, supra note 11, at 58).
33. SOCIOECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS FOR GLOBAL ACTION,supra note 31, at 3.
34. See Schafer et al.,supra note 24, at 10. The EPA has called one form of dioxin the most po-
tent synthetic carcinogen ever found. Center for Health and Environmental Justice, The American
Peoples Dioxin Report: Technical Support Document (2000), at http://www.mindfully.org/pesticide/
dioxin-report-cehj.htm.
35. See ANNE PLATT McGINN, WHY POISON OURSELVES? A PRECAUTIONARY APPROACH TO SYN-
THETIC CHEMICALS 8 (2000). See also HARTE ET AL., supra note 6, at xii; Schafer et al., supra not 24, at
10, 23-24; [ARC Monographs on the Evaluation of Carcinogenic Risks to Humans, Polychlori-
nated Dibenzo-para-dioxins and Polychlorinated Dibenzofurans (1997); WOMEN'S ENVIRONMENT AND
DEVELOPMENT ORGANIZATION (WEDO), A PERSISTENT ORGANIC POLLUTANTS PRIMER 2 (1998),
available at http://www.wedo.org/ehealth/popsprimer.
36. See Schafer et al., supra note 24, at 23 (citing studies that link POPs to neurodevelopmental
problems and reduced intellectual performance in both children and monkeys exposed to PCBs).
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The most important impact of POPs-one that has emerged only recently
in studies and the popular press-may well be non-cancer risks associated with
exposure." Rachel Carson's Silent Spring warned of these so-called endocrine-
disrupting effects of DDT, which led to the rapid decline in bird populations in
the 1960s." s The authors of Our Stolen Future9 sounded a similar alarm with
regard to endocrine disruption, exploring possible links between exposure to ex-
traordinarily low levels of POPs and disruptions in animal and human hormone
systems, including the male and female sex hormones responsible for fetal devel-
opment." Endocrine disruption studies present evidence of reproductive and
immune system damage4 1 occurring during pregnancy, when endocrine-
disrupting chemicals mimic or block signals sent to a developing fetus to guide
its development. 42 Disruption during this stage is thought to lead to serious
problems as the offspring develops, including, cancer, endometriosis, learning
disorders, behavioral disorders, low sperm count, and genital malformations.
43
Additionally, endocrine-disrupting chemicals have effects on developing fetae at
different "developmental windows" and dosages, which makes estimating their
effects extremely problematic. 44 These chemicals also appear to have additive,
synergistic effects that do not appear until the offspring reach puberty.45 Due to
these factors, and the ability of POPs to bioaccumulate in fatty tissue and trans-
37. JOHN S. APPLEGATE ET AL.,supra note 4, at 39-42. Traditionally, risk assessment, the process
by which scientists and policymakers analyze and measure health effects from chemical exposure,
has focused on cancerous effects of those chemicals. Lallas,supra note 10, at 94;seealso COLBORN ET
AL.,supra note 12, at 19 ("For the past three decades, ['toxic chemicals'] have become almost synon-
ymous with cancer not only in the public mind but in the minds of scientists and regulators as
well ... ").
38. Schafer et al., supra note 24, at 25.
39. COLBORN ET AL.,supra note 12.
40. Schafer et al., supra note 24, at 24.
41. Lallas, supra note 10, at 94 (citing numerous studies on endocrine disruption related to
POPs); see also AMAP Report, supra note 27, ch. 6 (identifying numerous adverse effects in wild-
life linked to POPs, including eggshell thinning and lowered reproductive capacity among birds
of prey); THE ROYAL SOCIETY OF CHEMISTRY, REPORT ON ENDOCRINE DISRUPTING CHEMICALS
(EDCs) (2000).
42. Women's Environment and Development Organization (WEDO), The Dirty Dozen: POPs
Designated for International Action 4 (2001), available at http://www.wedo.org/ehealth/
popsprimer2.htm.
43. Id.
44. Lallas,supra note 10, at 94.
45. Id.
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mit from mother to child through fetal development or breast milk,46 endocrine
disruptions present significant potential dangers for human populations with
extensive exposure to these pollutants.4 7 This fact is particularly troubling in
light of findings that POPs are found around the globe48 in measurable amounts
that may be sufficient to cause significant endocrine disruption.49
The research on endocrine disruption is still in its early stages, and there is still
no scientific consensus about how endocrine disruption affects human health."0
Despite compelling evidence implicating chemical contamination in the disrup-
tion of certain fish and wildlife endocrine systems, "the relationship of human dis-
eases of the endocrine system and exposure to environmental contaminants is
poorly understood and scientifically controversial."5 This lack of consensus re-
flects both the relatively recent nature of the research on endocrine disruption and
constraints involved in constructing experiments on human beings. Information
on human effects is also limited due to scarcity of data on concentrations of con-
taminants in human embryos and the lack of multi-generational exposure studies
that simulate ambient concentrations.52 Despite the lack of conclusive evidence
about effects on human systems from chemical contamination, observed and well-
documented effects on wildlife species provide the incentive for prophylactic reg-
ulation that could prevent further exposure to these dangerous compounds.
Due in part to the advocacy of domestic environmental groups, developed
countries have already banned or restricted several of the POPs discussed here. 3
However, POPs are exported to non-regulating countries, where they are used for
46. Id. (citing AMAP Report, supra note 27; COLBORN ET AL., supra note 12).
47. See generally JANE HOULIHAN ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL WORKING GROUP (EWG),
MOMS ... AND POPs: PERSISTENT ORGANIC POLLUTANTS IN THE DIETS OF PREGNANT AND NURSING
WOMEN (2000).
48. See Schafer et al.,supra note 24 at 9.
49. See id. at 24-25.
50. See Lallas,supra note 10, at 96. See generally AMAP Report,supra note 27; U.S. Environmen-
tal Protection Agency Endocrine Disruptor Screening Program Website, at http://www.epa.gov/
scipoly/oscpendo/ [hereinafter Endocrine Disruptor Screening Program Website].
51. Endocrine Disruptor Screening Program Website, supra note 50; see also COLBORN ET AL.,
supra 12, at 13-15; Howard A. Bern et al., Chemically-Induced Alterations in Sexual Development:
The WildlifelHuman Connection (The Wingspread Consensus Statement) [hereinafter Wingspread
Statement], in COLBORN ET AL., supra note 12, at 252-60; AMAP Report, supra note 27, at ch. 12.
52. See Wingspread Statement, supra note 51, at 255-58.
53. McGinn,supra note 3, at 75;see also Roger Thurow, Asa Tropical Scourge Makes a Comeback, So,
Too, Does DDT, WALL ST. J., July 26,2001, at Al (focusing on the DDT-malaria issue in South Africa).
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agricultural and related pest-control applications. 4 Use of the pesticide POPs in
agriculture leads to poisoning among farm workers, who are often uninformed
about the dangers posed by these chemicals.55 Results from this exposure can in-
clude sterility," cancer, miscarriages, deformed babies, and even death for farm
workers.57 POPs are especially devastating in the developing world, where coun-
tries often lack the capacity to regulate POPs domestically.58 Worse still, pesticide
POPs have been included in aid packages to developing countries, despite known
or suspected negative health effects.59 Writers describing exports of hazardous
chemicals have labeled this practice "environmental racism,"-the behavior by
which some humans are treated worse than others, and forced to live under envi-
ronmental conditions that the more powerful would never accept.6' The extreme
poverty of developing nations creates a dynamic in which the states accept danger-
ous chemicals-either for disposal or deposit onto export crops-because they
54. Robin L. Cowling, PIC, POPs and the MAIApocalypse: Our Environmental Future as a Func-
tion of Investors' Rights and Chemical Management Initiatives, 21 Hous. J. I NT'L L. 231, 265 (1999);
see also James H. Colopy, Poisoning the Developing World: The Exportation of Unregistered and Se-
verely Restricted Pesticides from the United States, 13 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 167, 173 (1994).
Pesticide POPs are routinely sold to developing countries by U.S. multinational corporations, de-
spite domestic regulation in the exporting country based on the chemicals' potential danger to
humans. See generally WEIR & SCHAPIRO,supra note 14.
55. Cowling, supra note 54, at 235; see also WEIR & SCHAPIRO, supra note 14, at 10-17 (describing
effects of the global pesticide trade in the early 1980s, particularly on agricultural workers in
developing nations).
56. See Costa Rica: The Price of Bananas, THE ECONOMIST, Mar. 12, 1994, at 48.
57. WEIR & SCHAPIRO,supra note 14, at 11-13. Modern estimates of the number of pesticide poi-
sonings each year reach 25 million, most of which occur in the developing world, according to the
U.S.-based Global Environment Facility (GEF). Moussa Awuonda, Pesticide Poisoning Pose Con-
cern to Third World, AFR. CHURCH INFO. SERVICE, June 11, 2001,at http://allafrica.com/stories.
58. WEIR & SCHAPIRO,supra note 14, at 15-16. According to the authors, illiteracy and the lack of
knowledge about dangerous chemicals leads to poisonings on a massive scale, most of which could
have been avoided. See also Faith Halter, Regulating Information Exchange and International Trade
in Pesticides and Other Toxic Substances to Meet the Needs of Developing Countries, 12 COLUM. J.
ENVTL. L. 1,4-5 (1987); Colopy, supra note 54, at 173-79.
59. WEIR & SCHAPIRO,supra note 14, at 48-64;see also Awounda,supra note 57.
60. The "racism" enters the equation because the exporters of hazardous chemicals tend to be
Caucasian, while the importing countries are generally African or South/Central American. See
FACES OF ENVIRONMENTAL RACISM: CONFRONTING ISSUES OF GLOBAL JUSTICE, at ix-xiii (Laura
Westra & Peter S. Wenz eds., 1995); see also Rozelia S. Park, An Examination ofInternational Envi-
ronmental Racism Through the Lens of Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Wastes, 5 1ND. J. GLO-
BAL LEGAL STUD. 659 (1998); Hugh J. Marbury, Note, Hazardous Waste Exportation: The Global
Manifestation of Environmental Racism, 28 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 251 (1995).
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have no choice.6' Indeed, many argue that this problem is unlikely to improve as
long as cash crops are required to pay foreign debt.62
II. EVOLUTION OF GLOBAL CONCERN OVER POPs
As indicated above, many POPs were banned in the United States and na-
tions of Western Europe after initial concern over their effects surfaced in the
1970s.63 Regional bans, including a series of initiatives in the North Sea and other
regions of Europe, among the countries of the European Union represent other
attempts to regulate POPs on a broader scale.'l Regional bans were also imple-
mented in North America as part of a series of initiatives to take action against
toxic chemicals in the Great Lakes ecosystems.65 In 1995, Canada, Mexico, and the
United States agreed to a Resolution on the Sound Management of Chemicals
under the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, which
called for the development of action plans to address problems posed by persistent
toxic substances.66 Despite the progress they represent, however, regional bans are
limited in their potential effectiveness against chemicals with the properties of
POPs.67 One reason is that developing countries tend not to become parties to
these regional bans, which means that the chemicals may still be imported into
those countries without prohibition. Further, through evidence of long-range
61. See Cowling, supra note 54, at 240.
62. Id, at 236.
63. See Lallas,supra note 10, at 91; see also Chen, supra note 20, at 121.
64. See The Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North East Atlan-
tic (the OSPAR Convention), Sept. 22, 1992, available at http://www.ospar.org/eng/html/wel-
come.html; see also 1979 Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution and its 1998
Protocols on POPs and heavy metals, United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (ECE),
U.N. Salves No. E.99.I1.E.21 (June 1998), at http://www.unece.org/envArtapArtap-hl.htm. See
generally John Buccini, POPs: Recent Developments in the Intergovernmental Forum on Chemical
Safety (from the proceedings of the UNEP Cartagena workshop), at http://irptc.unep.ch/pops/
popsjinc/proceedings/cartagena/buccini I .html.
65. See U.S.-Canada Bi-national Strategy for the Virtual Elimination of Toxic Substances, April
1997, at http://www.epa.gov/glnpo/p2/bns.html; see also Peter Lallas, Canada-United States Bina-
tional Strategy for the Virtual Elimination of Toxic Substances in the Great Lakes, 32 INT'L LAw 515
(1998).
66. See North American Commission for Environmental Cooperation, at http://www.cec.org/
programs.projects/pollutantshealth/index.cfm?varlan=english (describing the agreement's
chemicals program).
67. See Lallas, supra note 10, at 101-05. See generally Schafer et al., supra note 24 (discussing
weaknesses of the OSPAR Convention as a means of addressing the POPs problem).
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transport of POPs, in conjunction with information about their persistence and
toxicity, policymakers and societies have become more aware of the transbound-
ary nature of toxic problems, and the resulting implications for global environ-
mental systems. 6 Thus, increased understanding of the dangers of POPs, and the
realization that they do not respect national or continental boundaries, contrib-
uted to the consensus that international regulation was necessary.
A. International Action on POPs
Concerted international action on the problem of POPs began in the 1990s.
The 1992 Rio Earth Summit marked a step forward in international cooperation
to reduce the dangers of POPs and other toxic chemicals.69 In Rio, members of
the international community joined together to develop a set of principles on the
environment and development, along with an action plan entitled Agenda 21.70
Chapter 19 of Agenda 21 targets POPs, calling for actions that include "phasing
out or banning [toxic chemicals] that pose an unreasonable and otherwise un-
manageable risk to the environment or human health and those that are toxic,
persistent and bio-accumulative . 7 Agenda 21 also called for further action
to promote prior informed consent, which foreshadowed the negotiation of a
global treaty to regulate information on international shipments of hazardous
substances. 7
2
The concept of Prior Informed Consent (PIC) grew out of international
concern about the growing chemical trade. PIC reflects the notion that interna-
tional shipment of a pesticide that is banned or severely restricted in order to
protect human health or the environment should not proceed without the agree-
ment of a competent national authority in the importing country.73 In 1985, the
68. See EDITH BROWN WEISS & SZASZ MAGRAW, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY
528-31 (1998); see also HUNTER ET AL., INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY (1998)
(identifying pollution from toxic chemicals and hazardous wastes as one of the four basic global
environmental issues).
69. See Lallas, supra note 10, at 103.
70. See, e.g., HUNTER ET AL.,supra note 68 (discussing the Rio Conference extensively).
71. Agenda 21, § 2, para. 19.49, June 14, 1992, at http'//www.un.org/esa/sustdev/
agenda2 ltext.htm.
72. See Rotterdam Convention on Prior Informed Consent Procedure for Certain Hazardous
Chemicals and Pesticides in International Trade (Rotterdam PIC Convention), opened for signa-
ture Sept. 10, 1998, at http://www.pic.int//en/viewpage.asp? id = 104.
73. Cowling, supra note 54, at 242-43;seealso Colopy, supra note 54, at 198.
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U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) developed an International
Code to guide this process.74 The International PIC Code, along with the 1987
UNEP guidelines, was designed to increase access to information regarding
hazardous chemicals for all states.7" These documents, and the international
concern that inspired them, led eighty nations to negotiate and sign the Rotter-
dam PIC Convention in September 1998.76 The PIC Convention is premised
upon the goal of promoting shared responsibility between importers and export-
ers over the health and environmental risks associated with hazardous sub-
stances.77 One disadvantage of the International PIC Code is that it is voluntary,
and does not contain any mechanisms to ensure compliance; rather, it relies upon
the collaborative efforts of actors in international trade to guarantee its success.7"
Another major disadvantage of the PIC procedure generally is that the system
does not develop the regulatory expertise of the developing countries; instead, it
requires officials from such countries to "sign off" on shipments about which
they really know very little.79
Despite its limitations, however, the Rotterdam PIC Convention makes an
important contribution to global chemicals management by drawing attention
to those substances that cause the greatest harm, disseminating information
about the harms caused by these substances, and facilitating national decision-
making on chemical imports.8 °
Along with the notion of PIC, the dangers of POPs have emerged in the years
since the Rio Summit as a top priority in the international community."' Momen-
74. International Code of Conduct on the Distribution and Use of Pesticides, EA.O. Res. 10/85,
U.N. F.A.O., 25th Sess. (1989), reprinted in BASIC DOCUMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW 173 (Stanley P. Johnson & Gunther Handl, eds, 1989) [hereinafter International PIC Code];
see also Cowling, supra note 54, at 241-43.
75. Cowling, supra note 54, at 241.
76. For a careful analysis of the PIC Convention and likely effectiveness, see generally Emory,
supra note 17 (probing "substantial" weaknesses of the Convention and offering suggestions for
revising it).
77. See U.N. Environment Programme (UNEP), PIC: Prior Informed Consent for Certain
Hazardous Chemicals in International Trade, at http://irptc.unep.ch/pic.
78. See International PIC Code,supra note 74, at 186;seealso Colopy, supra note 54, at 245.
79. Colopy, supra note 54, at 197; see also GRETTA GOLDENMAN & SAROJINI RENGAM, PROBLEM
PESTICIDES, PESTICIDE PROBLEMS: A CITIZENs' ACTION GUIDE TO THE INTERNATIONAL CODE OF CON-
DUCT ON THE DISTRIBUTION AND USE OF PESTICIDES 3 (2d ed. 1988).
80. World Wildlife Fund (WWF), Advancing International Controls on Toxic Chemicals 2 (Apr.
2001), at http://www.worldwildlife.org/toxics/pubres/treatyratif.pdf.
81. Lallas, supra note 10, at 105.
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turn to confront the dangers from POPs grew with the creation of the Intergov-
ernmental Forum on Chemical Safety (IFCS) in 1994 in Stockholm, Sweden. 2 A
year later, the UNEP conference in Washington on land-based sources of marine
pollution called for international action to reduce or eliminate POPs.
83
UNEP led the way toward creating the first global treaty on POPs, calling
for an international assessment process for POPs in 1995.84 In 1996, the Intergov-
ernmental Forum on Chemical Safety (IFCS) held a weeklong meeting in
Manila at which technical experts presented recommendations for developing a
legally binding global treaty on POPsA5 Then, in February 1997, the IFCS pre-
sented its findings to the international community, gathered at a meeting of the
UNEP Governing Council. This led to a legal mandate to negotiate a binding
multinational treaty, focusing exclusively on the initial twelve POPs for imme-
diate action, 86 and agreeing to finalize the treaty by the year 2000."7 In early 1997,
UNEP adopted Decision 19/13, recommending that the Governing Council es-
tablish an Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee (INC) to negotiate a glo-
82. See IFCS Website, at http//www.who.int/ifcs. The IFCS, which served as a forum for high-
level international environmental policymakers, was to play a critical role in developing a man-
date for negotiating the POPs convention. Lallas,supra note 10, at 108.
83. Washington Conference on Land-Based Sources of Marine Pollution, Oct.-Nov. 1995
(adopting a "Global Program of Action for the Protection of the Marine Environment from
Land-Based Activities," which called for international action to address POPs); see also UNEP
Conference on Protection of the Marin Environmental from Land-Based Activities, Washington, 1995,
at http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/prot-res/pr/fpweb/icri/text/2115b.htm.
84. Cowling, supra note 54, at 266 (discussing the adoption of Decision 18/32, in which the
UNEP Governing Council invited the Inter-Organization Programme for the Sound Manage-
ment of Chemicals (IOMC), the International Programme on Chemical Safety (IPCS), and the
IFCS to assess the "dirty dozen" POPs and present UNEP with regulatory recommendations); see
also Decision 18/32 of the UNEP Governing Council: Persistent Organic Pollutants, G.C. Dec. 18/32,
U.N. EP, 18th Sess., 9th mtg., U.N. Doc. UNEP/GC.18/32 (1995),availableat http://irptc.unep.ch/
pops/indxhtms/gc 1 832en.html.
85. See Cheryl Hogue, U.N. Urged to Negotiate Treaty on Persistent Organic Pollutants, 19 INT'L
ENV'T REP. 808 (1996).
86. Cowling, supra note 54, at 267. In Decision 19/13C, the UNEP Governing Council con-
cluded that "international action is required to reduce the risks.., from the release of the twelve
specified POPs." G.C. Dec. 19/13C, U.N. EP, 19th Sess., 8th mtg., U.N. Doc. UNEP/GC.19/13C
(1997) (emphasis added), available at http://irptc.unep.ch/pops/gcpops-e.html [hereinafter Deci-
sion 19/13C]. Indeed, the question about what chemicals to add, when to add them, and how to do
so would plague delegates throughout the negotiations.
87. See Decision 19/13C, supra note 86; see also Michael Roberts, UNEPAimsfor POPs Treaty by
2000, CHEMICAL WK., Feb. 26, 1997, at 49.
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bal POPs instrument.88 From late 1997 to 2000, UNEP INC sessions and
Awareness Workshops brought together experts and policymaking officials to
discuss scientific and technical issues raised by POPs and to negotiate the
treaty.8 9 It was through these vehicles that the primary negotiations for the POPs
occurred, and their story is the story of the POPs experience.
B. Early POPs Issues
From the outset, POPs presented a number of substantive issues that nego-
tiators of a global treaty had to resolve. The parties first had to identify guiding
principles for the negotiations. Perhaps the most important of these principles
was how to present the need for caution in response to the significant uncer-
tainty surrounding POPs and their effects, and whether to refer to a "precau-
tionary principle" explicitly in the agreement.9" Another important issue early
on was how quickly to eliminate the use of POPs with continuing beneficial
uses.9' While an immediate ban on many of the POPs would be the most
extreme-and likely the most environmentally beneficial control strategy-
negotiators recognized the need to develop viable alternatives to the chemicals
that could be made widely available.92 Another important early issue facing ne-
gotiators was how to ensure the careful and efficient management of existing
stocks of POPs to ensure that they would not be traded illegally or misused.93
88. Decision 19/13C,supra note 86; Lallas,supra note 10, at 109.
89. See Lallas,supra note 10, at 111-18.
90. See discussion infra text accompanying notes 183-88, 191-214;see also Lallas,supra note 10,
at 113 n.1 18 (asserting that the precautionary principle issue has become one of the most conten-
tious in international environmental policy). This concept is encapsulated in Principle 15 of The
Rio Declaration, and has been included in many multilateral environmental agreements since
then. See, e.g., Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, June 14, 1992, princ. 15, 31
I.L.M. 814, 816 (1992), available at http:// www.unep.org/documents/default.asp?documen-
tid=78&articleid= 1163 [hereinafter Rio Declaration], PATRICIA W. BIRNIE & ALAN E. BOYLE, IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW AND THE ENVIRONMENT 95-98, 455 (1992). For further discussion of this issue,
see HUNTER ET AL., supra note 68.
91. UNEP Decision 19/13C(b) recommends the use of transition periods, with "phased imple-
mentation of various proposed actions." See Decision 19/13C,supra note 86. Transition periods are
particularly important with respect to certain industrial chemicals, including PCBs, which re-
main in wide use.
92. Chen, supra note 20, at 134-35 (discussing bans and restrictions of POPs). The debate over
DDT, discussed below, was particularly strong with regard to this point.
93. In the wake of the Montreal Protocol, a black market in CFCs has developed which is thought
to be second in significance only to the international trade in illegal narcotics. See Elizabeth R.
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The participation of developing countries in the negotiation and implemen-
tation of the POPs regime arose as another fundamental issue in the early part of
the negotiation process. Initial questions concerned whether the "short list" of
POPs identified for regulation even reflected the priorities of governments of
the developing world, whose greatest concern centered on other substances with
greater acute toxicity to workers, but insufficient persistence to be considered
POPs.94 Deeper questions involved how to address the special needs of develop-
ing countries in implementing global environmental treaties, and how to incor-
porate these perspectives into the developing POPs regime.95 From the outset, it
was clear to policymakers and observers alike that financial and technical assis-
tance would have to be provided to developing countries to enable the countries
to find alternatives and re-tool their manufacturing facilities.96 Structuring par-
ticipation by developing countries throughout the POPs regime negotiation
process also presented a formidable obstacle to negotiating an effective treaty.
The way that negotiators were able to overcome these obstacles and craft a treaty
regime that is likely to be successful at reducing the dangers from global POPs
yields many lessons, both for the immediate POPs problem and for future inter-
national environmental agreements.
III. CONFRONTING TENSIONS IN INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
Prior to the first multinational environmental conference in Stockholm in
1972, many developing countries did not accept the necessity of global coopera-
tion to protect the environment. 97 During the Stockholm Convention, many un-
industrialized countries of the global South suspected that the wealthy nations
DeSombre, The Experience of the Montreal Protocol: Particularly Remarkable, and Remarkably Partic-
ular, 19 UCLA J. ENvrL. L. & POL'Y 49, 62-69 (2000) (discussing the danger of a black market in
CFCs but concluding that it does not pose a long-term threat to the health of the Protocol system);see
also Emory,supra note 17 at 53 (discussing the "huge challenges" these illegal CFC imports present to
the operation of effective domestic or international environmental protection programs).
94. Lallas, supra note 10, at 112.
95. The concept of "common but differentiated responsibilities" for developing countries im-
plementing international environmental agreements was developed as part of the Rio Declara-
tion. Rio Declaration,supra note 90, princ. 7.
96. Cowling, supra note 54, at 272-73 (asserting that a worldwide ban was needed for POPs and
making its success contingent upon the provision of "extensive support to the developing world").
97. See ALEXANDRE Kiss & DINAH SHELTON, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 624 (2d ed.
2000) (asserting that environmental problems were considered "predominantly an ailment of rich,
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of the North subordinated foreign economic development to environmental
protection, "considering the former less urgent than pollution and nature pro-
tection."98 These developing countries "feared that funds previously dedicated
to development would be diverted to fight environmental deterioration," result-
ing in a net loss of funds set aside for the South.' In addition, developing coun-
tries expressed concerns that environmental provisions could be used by
industrialized states to impose restrictions on exports from the South, effectively
barring access to worldwide markets.' 0
Prior to the 1972 Convention, states in the global South also generally re-
jected the notion that environmental resources are global assets, subject to global
protection.' ' The idea that these resources constitute common heritage is con-
sidered hypocritical by developing countries who have witnessed the manner in
which industrialized nations in the North are depleting their own natural re-
sources, often more quickly than resources are being depleted in the developing
world.0 2 Finally, states in the South fear that environmental protection, espe-
cially of scarce natural resources, is an "unaffordable luxury" that the industrial-
ized North is trying to convince them to purchase.0 3
From these first manifestations to the present, international environmental
law has been marked by tension between the abstract environmental concerns of
industrialized countries"); see also VED P. NANDA, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY
13 (1994) (describing less-developed countries' view that environmental protection was the "rich
men's problem, [the] rich men's solution") (quoting Elizabeth P. Barratt-Brown, Building A Moni-
toring and Compliance Regime Under the Montreal Protocol, 16 YALE J. INT'L L. 519, 534 (1991)).
98. See Kiss& SHELTON,supra note 97, at 624; see also NANDA,supra note 97 , at 13.
99. Kiss & SHELTON, supra note 97, at 624; see also NANDA, supra note 97, at 13; Bing Ling, Devel-
oping Countries and Ozone Layer Protection: Issues, Principles and Implications, 6 TUL. ENVTL. L.J.
91,99 (1992).
100. See NANDA,supra note 97, at 13.
101. See id. ("The assertion that resources within the territory of a sovereign state now belong to
all of humanity, and that that state cannot freely exploit those resources, is particularly unpopular
in former colonies.") (citing Ranee K.L. Panjabi, The South and the Earth Summit: The Develop-
ment/Environment Dichotomy, II DICK. J. INT'L L. 77, 98-99 (1992)).
102. See NANDA, supra note 97, at 13 (citing arguments by developing countries that the Pacific
Northwestern United States' timber resources have been depleted far more extensively by clear-
cutting than the well-publicized destruction of the Brazilian rain forests that incite environmen-
talists' ire); see also NASSAU A. ADAMS, WORLDS APART: THE NORTH-SOUTH DIVIDE AND THE INTER-
NATIONAL SYSTEM 204 (1993).
103. NANDA,supra note 97, at 13.
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the North and the specific development needs of the South.' ° In an attempt to
reconcile the competing global interests over environmental issues, negotiators
at the 1972 Stockholm Convention coined the term "sustainable development,"
which has proved to be as ambiguous as the problem that inspired it."°s Govern-
ments of developing countries have been suspicious of this twist in the environ-
mental debate-South as co-conspirator in harm to the global environment-
and have expressed their ire at constraints implicit in the concept of sustainable
development. °6 In this way, global environmental debates are marked by ten-
sion between rich and poor, developed and undeveloped '°7-tension mediated
by the illusory notion of sustainable development.' s
This friction is often borne out in multilateral environmental agreements
(MEAs). Despite the fact that environmental regimes can and do generate broad
participation in some instances, developing countries often characterize these
treaties, and the globalizing forces that bring them about, as a new form of colo-
nialism."° Thus, environmental treaties are often viewed as the means through
104. See generally Kiss & SHELTON, supra note 97, at 623-28 (describing the history of integrating
developing countries into the process of international environmental law).
105. See A. Dan Tarlock, Ideas Without Institutions: The Paradox of Sustainable Development, 9
INn. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 35, 39 (2001); see also BIRNIE & BOYLE, supra note 90, at 122-24 (high-
lighting the progressive argument that sustainable development is the central concept in interna-
tional environmental policy, but noting the lack of any comparable consensus about the concept);
LYNTON KEITH CALDWELL, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY: FROM THE TWENTIETH TO THE
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 9 (3d. ed 1996) (asserting that, despite its shortcomings, the sustainable
development movement could strengthen international environmental policy and action by inte-
grating ecological and economic theory in the concept of natural economics). See generally Kiss &
SHELTON, supra note 97, at 248-49 (providing background on the concept and an original defini-
tion of the phrase).
106. See ADAMS, supra note 102, at 204-07. Countries were especially incensed at calls by North-
ern environmentalists to halt land-clearing or other commercial exploitation of their lands to save
the environment, while rich countries continued their extravagant burning of fossil fuels and
overloaded the environment with noxious wastes generated by their excessive consumption
habits. Id. at 204.
107. See id. at 206.
108. See John S. Applegate & Alfred C. Aman, Jr., Introduction: Syncopated Sustainable Develop-
ment, 9 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 1,2, 11 (2001) (discussing "soft" and "hard" versions of sustain-
able development, and concluding that analysis of the tension over global resource allocation
issues "end[sl in questions" rather than answers).
109. See Raymond William Baker, Egypt in the Space and Time of Globalism, in GLOBALIZATION:
POLICIES, CHALLENGES, AND RESPONSES 243-56 (Shereen T. Ismael ed., 1999); see also Danielle S.
Petito, Note, Sovereignty and Globalization: Fallacies, Truth, and Perception, 17 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HuM.
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which rich Northern countries attempt to export their eco-consciousness to
developing countries.
In many treaty contexts, this division can lead to insurmountable obstacles
to negotiating treaty language, and indeed can prevent countries from reaching
any consensus at all. The Basel Convention, which attempts to regulate the in-
ternational movement of hazardous wastes, is an example of treaty negotiations
that have been significantly hampered by the North-South divide."' During the
drafting of the documents that would become the Basel Convention in early
1989, delegates disagreed over numerous issues, including the question of prior
informed consent (PIC) and even the definition of hazardous waste."' More
basic, however, was the Basel Convention's failure to ban the exportation of haz-
ardous wastes. Instead of an outright ban, the Convention attempts to regulate
the exportation and handling of hazardous waste through a set of integrated in-
ternational and national standards."
2
The regulation approach to managing hazardous waste imports and exports
was rejected by numerous African states in particular, which view hazardous
waste exportation to Africa as a crime against African people."13 Due to the lack of
technical expertise and administrative capabilities of many African nations, these
states are particularly susceptible to illegal dumping, a phenomenon all too com-
RTs. 1139 (2001) (arguing that globalization erodes sovereignty); Steven Mark, Harmonization or
Homogenization?: The Globalization of Law and Legal Ethics: An Australian Viewpoint, 34 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 1173 (2001) (arguing that globalization generally can lead to homogenization).
110. For interesting perspectives on this troubled regime, compare Daniel Jaffe, Note and Com-
ment, The International Effort to Control the Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Waste: The
Basel and Bamako Conventions, 2 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 123 (1995) (detailing the UNEP's
largely unsuccessful attempt to regulate the hazardous waste trade), with William N. Doyle,
Comment, United States Implementation of the Basel Convention: Time Keeps Ticking, Ticking Away,
9 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 141, 160 (1995) (concluding that "the Basel Convention represents an
important, much needed step in the international effort to control the international waste trade").
For an interesting perspective on the problems of transboundary pollution generally, see Thomas
W. Merrill, Golden Rules for Transboundary Pollution, 46 DUKE L.J. 931, 988 (1997) (concluding
that "effective regimes of collective action regulating transboundary pollution are not very likely
to emerge" and that regulation of transboundary pollution is likely to come about, if at all,
through evolution of other types of institutions).
111. See Jaffe,supra note 110, at 126-27.
112. Id. at 127 (citing David P. Hackett, An Assessment of the Basel Convention on the Control of
Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal, 5 AM. U. J. INT'LL. & POL'Y 291
(1990)); see also Doyle, supra note 110, at 143.
113. See Jaffe, supra note 110, at 130 (citing C. Russell H. Shearer, Comparative Analysis of the
Basel and Bamako Conventions on Hazardous Waste, 23 ENVTL. L. 142, 149 (1993)).
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mon in Africa." 4 In response to widespread dumping and concerns that "business
as usual" would not be abated by the Basel Convention, the Organization of Afri-
can Unity (OAU) adopted the Bamako Convention, with the intention of banning
all importation of hazardous waste into Africa."' Perhaps the most significant
feature of the Bamako Convention was its complete ban on imports of hazardous
wastes from non- parties" 6 (i.e. non-African states), which had been the most con-
tentious issue in the ratification of the Basel Convention. While the dispute over
whether or not to ban the export of hazardous wastes from industrialized
countries to Africa did not prevent the OAU states from sending delegates to, and
signing the final text of, the Basel Convention, 117 it remains the fundamental dif-
ference between the two Conventions. This difference, in conjunction with the
widely divergent definitions of hazardous waste to which countries continue to
subscribe, will likely prevent either of the hazardous waste conventions from
being effective international environmental agreements.'
8
Perhaps an even better example of the roadblocks that economic and cul-
tural divides pose to multilateral environmental agreements is the Kyoto Proto-
col," 9 which attempts to address the problem of global warming by setting
specific targets and timetables for reducing overall global emissions of green-
114. See id. at 130.
115. The Bamako Convention on the Ban of the Import into Africa and the Control of Transbound-
ary Movement and Management of Hazardous Wastes Within Africa, Jan. 29, 1991, at httpj/
www.jus.uio.no /m/hazardous.waste.ban.afrian.import.bamako.convention.1991/index.html [here-
inafter Bamako Convention].
116. See Jaffe, supra note 110, at 132.
117. See id. at 131.
118. Id. at 133. However, parties to the Basel negotiations have adopted, but not yet ratified, the
Basel Ban Amendment. The Basel Ban Amendment "prohibits the export, for any reason, of haz-
ardous wastes from member states of the OECD and Liechtenstein to all other countries." See
WWF, supra note 80, at 3; Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of
Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal, 1995 Ban Amendment, Sept. 22, 1995, at httpj/
www.unep.ch/basel/pub/baselban.html [hereinafter 1995 Ban Amendment]. To become a binding
part of the Basel regime, this Amendment will need to be ratified, along with the Convention, by
the parties to the original Basel Convention. 1995 Ban Amendment,supra. If it wins the support of
the Basel parties, the Basel Ban Amendment is likely to greatly strengthen a regime plagued with
division, and result in a viable global system of hazardous waste regulation.
119. Conference of the Parties to the Framework Convention on Climate Change: Kyoto Proto-
col, Dec. 10, 1997, reprinted in 37 I.L.M. 22 (1998) [hereinafter Kyoto Protocol].
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house gases (GHGs).2 ° Despite concerted efforts and extended negotiations
among participating parties, no firm targets were included, and the regime has
been commonly considered a failure.' 2' This perceived lack of success is due in
large part to the regime's failure to secure the participation of the developing
countries China, India, Brazil, and Indonesia, and the resulting failure of do-
mestic ratification in the United States. 2 2 However, with the ratification of the
Protocol by Poland on August 8,2002, and the European Union's focus on secur-
ing the rest of the ratifications, the regime will likely enter into implementation
soon, albeit without the participation of several key players.
123
In the POPs context, some negotiations between members of the Intergov-
ernmental Negotiating Committee (INC) illustrated North-South friction, at
least on the issue of elimination of DDT.12' This issue presents the choice be-
tween strict regulation or ban (when feasible) on the one hand, and elimination
without qualifications on the other. 125 Another divisive issue dealt with funding
commitments to the developing world, with parties voicing various institu-
tional, administrative, and oversight concerns. 126 Despite often-daunting divi-
sions, the story of the sessions illustrates how extensive participation from the
world health and environmental communities was able to create an atmosphere
in which issues could be resolved and significant progress achieved in the regu-
lation of POPs.
120. See Ved P. Nanda, The Kyoto Protocol on Climate Change and the Challenges to Its Implemen-
tation:A Commentary, 10 CoLo. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 319, 321 (1999).
121. See id. at 321-22 (discussing the "serious questions" that have arisen about the implementa-
tion of the goals of the Kyoto Protocol, and its bleak prospects for addressing global climate).
122. Instead of signing the Kyoto Protocol, which it believes would damage the domestic econ-
omy, the second Bush Administration intends to implement its Clear Skies Initiative, part of a set
of voluntary reductions in greenhouse gas emissions. See The U.S. Alternative to the Kyoto Protocol,
PLATTS GLOBAL ENERGY, at http://www.platts.com/features/kyotoprotoco/usalternative.shtml
(last visited Feb. 13, 2003). The European Union's reaction to this move by the Bush Administra-
tion was to push ahead on the Kyoto Protocol, accusing the United States of backing out of com-
mitments made during the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). Id.
123. See WWF, WWF Welcomes the Polish Ratification of the Kyoto Climate Treaty, Aug. 9, 2002, at
http://www.panda.org/about-wwf/what-we-do/climate-change/news/news.cfm?unewsid=2640.
With Poland's participation, 74 countries accounting for only 36% of the world's GHG emissions
will be parties to the treaty. Id.
124. As the discussion below indicates, however, the issue of elimination divided negotiators
from different countries more generally into patterns that cannot be described as North-South.
125. See Lallas, supra note 10, at 99 (claiming that this tension has characterized international
work on POPs).
126. See infra notes 215-19 and accompanying text.
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A. Addressing Tension Through Public Participation
UNEP and state parties negotiating the POPs convention sought to address
potential tensions by including as many perspectives as possible in the negotia-
tions. One important way in which this was done was through the inclusion of
NGOs as observers of the negotiation process.'27 The POPs INC Rules of Proce-
dure created roles for NGOs to take in the negotiations, and many groups took
advantage of these opportunities, participating in formal meetings and organiz-
ing related events.128 Prior to the first INC session in Montreal in July 1988, a
small group of NGOs combined to form the International POPs Elimination
Network (IPEN), dedicated to a number of common positions with respect to
POPs. Made up of international environmental and public health NGOs, IPEN
was created to provide a forum for developing country NGOs to participate in
the Stockholm POPs negotiations.'2 9 In fact, in addition to many large NGOs
from the North, including Greenpeace, World Wildlife Fund, and others, the
vast majority of IPEN member groups hail from developing countries. 3 ° IPEN
member groups represented a broad spectrum of citizens' groups dealing with a
range of issues related to environmental and public health. 3' These NGOs
made their positions extremely clear during the INC sessions and worked to ed-
ucate their own country representatives about the important public health and
environmental concerns POPs pose to different populations.' These groups
127. Normally, negotiations for Multilateral Environmental Agreements (MEAs) are carried on
in relative obscurity with very little NGO interaction; in the POPs context, NGOs were active in
various roles throughout the negotiating process, by, e.g., generating awareness, providing addi-
tional perspectives and expertise, and helping to highlight problems among negotiators. See Lal-
las, supra note 10, at 118-35.
128. See id. at 118-20.
129. For more information on IPEN and its work during and since the negotiations, see IPEN
Website, at http://www.ipen.org.
130. See id.
131. See id.
132. See id.
ANDREW J. YODER
also intervened in the negotiating process, held meetings of participating orga-
nizations, and even engaged in demonstrations.'
33
From the outset, member groups in IPEN organized around a set of prin-
ciples that developed into their Elimination Platform. 134 The platform articu-
lated IPEN's purpose: to facilitate a systematic, global program of action in
which all countries would participate to eliminate POPs and their release into
the environment. 135 Because of member groups' efforts, PEN helped define the
terms of the debate over POPs, arguing that the goal of the convention should be
elimination of POPs releases, as opposed to "management of risks" that POPs
pose to humans, wildlife and ecosystems. 3 6 IPEN member groups further in-
sisted that the delegates at the negotiating sessions adopt a no-tolerance policy
for POPs and work toward their rapid elimination wherever possible.'37 The
practical impact of these strong positions on the outcome of the treaty language
is evident, when the provisions are examined in this light.
B. Negotiating the POPs Convention
IPEN's position and input made strong impressions upon the tone and rhetoric
of the INC's first negotiating session (INC-I), as the opening remarks of Dr. Klaus
T6pfer, '38 Executive Director of UNEP, illustrate, showing the shift from language
of "POPs management" to POPs elimination.'39 The first set of meetings ended
with delegates adopting the TFCS report and UNEP Decision 19/13C as the man-
133. On the first day of negotiations in Montreal, Greenpeace staged a demonstration in which
participants donned costumes and displayed signs identifying themselves as "pregnant bellies for
the future," in order to highlight POPs' impacts upon women and developing children. See Lallas,
supra note 10, at 120.
134. IPEN, POPs Elimination Platform, Aug. 31, 1998, at http://ipen.ecn.cz/
index.php?z=&l=en&k =documents&r=viewtxt&id=17&id-rubriky =12.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Dr. T6pfer's remarks highlighted the "truly global threat" of POPs and called upon Gov-
ernments to act decisively, with a goal toward eliminating these pollutants instead of managing
them in better ways. UNEP, Report of the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee for an Interna-
tional Legally Binding Instrument for Implementing International Action on Certain Persistent Or-
ganic Pollutants on the Work of Its First Session (July 3, 1998), available at http://www.chem.unep.ch/
pops/pops-inc/incl/inc I finalreport-e.htm.
139. See Jack Weinburg & Claudia Saladin, IPEN Report from the First Session of the Intergovern-
mental Negotiating Committee (INC) on POPs, at http://www.ipen.org (last visited Feb. 13, 2003).
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date and guiding documents for the treaty regime. 40 While topics such as financial
assistance and shared responsibility were raised and discussed at these meetings,
concrete concerns about them that would create extreme tension between negotia-
tors in later INC sessions had not yet emerged. In fact, by the end of the weeklong
INC-I session on July 3, 1998, the POPs negotiations were off to a good start, and a
significant amount of business was accomplished in the first few days. 4 ' Even more
remarkable was the extensive public participation in INC-I, a theme that would be
repeated throughout the negotiations. At the first meeting alone, fifty-five organi-
zations were represented, with close to one hundred participants.
42
Domestically, the POPs negotiations seemed to enjoy strong political sup-
port from the Clinton Administration, 143 with a U.S. delegation led from 1998 to
2000 by Brooks Yeager, a well-known environmentalist. 144 Indeed, a general
"environmental" policy orientation was part of an image that Bill Clinton and
Al Gore fostered during their bid for re-election in 1996.14 Despite the Clinton
Administration's claim to have initiated and led the POPs negotiations, 146 how-
140. See id.
141. Seeid. ("Not a single country of the 100 or so present[] expressed reservations about the need
for an effective global agreement on POPs.").
142. See Lallas, supra note 10, at 114. Many more NGOs were represented at the negotiations by
the IPEN network, which consisted of a vast coalition of public health and environmental NGOs.
For a list of endorsing organizations, see IPEN Website,supra note 129.
143. In early 1998, officials in the State Department and the EPA announced the Administra-
tion's support for the POPs negotiations, proposing to take the lead in addressing issues posed by
POPs. See Environmental Media Services, Global Treaty to Ban, Restrict World's Worst Chemicals
Will Be Negotiated by 100-Plus Nations This Month, May 28, 1998, at http://www.ems.org/pops/
zz.fenton.98.05.28.html.
144. Brooks Yeager was a Vice President for the Audubon Society before joining the Clinton Ad-
ministration in 1993. See Henry Lamb, POPs May Be Hazardous to Your Lifestyle, ENTER-
STAGERIGHT.COM, Apr. 30, 2001, at http://www.enterstageright.com/archive/articles/0501pop.htm.
For Yeager's perspective on some issues in the POPs negotiations, see U.S. Statement on Persistent Or-
ganic Pollutants Treaty, Dec. 10, 2000, at http://usinfo.state.gov/topicallglobal/environAatest!
0012 1001.htm [hereinafter U.S. POPs Statementl.
145. "1 want an America in the year 2000 where ... no parent should have to worry about the
safety of a child's glass of water, and no neighborhood should be put in harm's way by pollution
from a nearby factory." President William J. Clinton, Aug. 28, 1996, available at http:/
clinton3.nara.gov/ceq/accomp.html.
146. E.g. President William J. Clinton's State of the Union Address, Jan. 27, 2000, available at
http:// clinton4.nara.gov/wh/sotuOO/sotu-text.html; see also Protecting the Global Environment,
May 1997, available at http://clinton4.nara.gov/textonly/ceq/earthday/ch7.html (claiming that the
Administration was "leading international negotiations to phase out 12 of the most dangerous,
[POPsI.").
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ever, further negotiations would reveal that its position was not always as
"green" as the Administration sought to portray.
The second negotiating session of the INC (INC-2) was held in Nairobi,
Kenya, during January 1999. This session emphasized concerns for women's
and indigenous people's health, and connected concerns over POPs in the envi-
ronment with data showing harm from exposure to women and other at-risk
groups.'47 Health professionals also gathered at INC-2 to discuss the medical
science concerns related to POPs, particularly with respect to DDT use and al-
ternatives in controlling malaria.' Perhaps most importantly, INC-2 engaged
developing countries, educating their delegates about risks and alternatives to
POPs, encouraging their participation in the implementation phase of the treaty,
and learning about their experiences with pesticide POPs.45
One issue raised at INC-I would form the basis of some disagreement at later
negotiating sessions. The issue of elimination of various POPs, as opposed to mere
management of the risks associated with them, divided delegations at INC-2.
While most of the 103 governments represented at INC-2, as well as environmen-
tal, public health, indigenous peoples, and women- and consumer-focused
NGOs, supported "elimination" of POPs as a core goal of the treaty, some govern-
ments-specifically those of the United States, Canada, and Australia-and the
chemical industry appeared to argue against elimination, even as a long-term
goal, for certain POPs.' Observers, wary that the ostensibly pro-environment
U.S. delegation was avoiding the elimination goal shared by most participants,
urged the Administration to work for outright elimination of POPs instead. 5'
As evidenced through accounts of the early negotiations, NGOs played an
important role at INC-2, making interventions on other key points, including
147. 1PEN, Report of IPEN Activities and Accomplishments at the Second Session of the Intergovern-
mental Negotiating Committee on POPs (Jan. 23-29,1999), at http://www.ipen.org/inc2.htm.
148. Id.
149. Id. ("Participants remarked at the balance between African and outside presenters, scien-
tists, and activists.").
150. See WWF, Global POPs Treaty Talks (cursory summary of negotiations), at http:/
www.worldwildlife.org/toxics/progareas/pop/global.htm (last visited Feb. 13, 2003) (on file with
author). Parties opposing broad "elimination" language in the POPs Convention argued that
stopping all production of chemicals such as dioxin (which are externalities of chlorine-based pro-
cesses) was not feasible.
151. See Nancy Dunne, Clinton 'Weak' on Chemicals Policy, FIN. TIMEs (London), Mar. 21, 2000,
at 10.
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the need for safe alternatives to POPs like DDT, information exchange, and
transparency, to name a few.'52 Like INC-1, INC-2 ended without significant di-
vision over many of the final treaty provisions, marked by rapid education and
developing consensus over most of the issues that concerned the negotiators.
C. Emerging Tensions and the DDT Dilemma in Geneva
At the third INC session (INC-3), held in Geneva, Switzerland on Septem-
ber 4-11, 1999, negotiations over the actual text of the treaty took place.'53 In
Geneva, further tensions emerged between various groups and countries partic-
ipating in the negotiations. Some of this tension crystallized in debates over the
pesticide DDT, which many in the media characterized as the most contentious
issue in the negotiations. 5 4 Long banned in the North, DDT is widely regarded
as a deadly poison."' DDT is used extensively and effectively, however, in com-
bating malaria, a disease that ravages the developing world.'56 While alterna-
tives to DDT-such as synthetic pyrethroids-are readily available, they are
152. See WWFsupra note 150.
153. IPEN News, Critical Period for Global POPs Negotiations (Nov. 1999), at http.//
www.ipen.org/ipennewsl 199.htm [hereinafter IPEN INC-3 Report].
154. Indeed, several issues were much more significant, but received less popular attention in the
press. See e-mail from Richard Liroff, WWF, to Andrew Yoder (Feb. 21, 2002, 17:20 EST) (on file
with author) [hereinafter Liroff E-mail];seealso Thurow,supra note 53, at A6 (describing the con-
flict between the developing world's use of DDT to combat malaria and the developed world,
who sought to "ban DDT completely" through the POPs Convention).
155. See Amir Attaran et al., Balancing Risks on the Backs of the Poor, 6 NATURE MED. 729 (2000)
("Few chemicals stir the feelings of the 'man on the street' quite like DDT.").
156. See Henk Bouwman, Malaria Controland the Paradox ofDDT, 8 AFR. ENV'T. & WILDLIFE (May
2000), http://www.icps.it/english/bollettino/psn00/000303.htm (asserting that every year, more than
275 million people develop clinical malaria). "DDT remains legal for use [in malaria control] in Bo-
livia, Venezuela, Mexico, Kenya, Tanzania, Ethiopia, Sudan, Mauritania, India, Nepal, Thailand,
Malaysia, Vietnam, and the Philippines, but is apparently available (and not always well-marked) in
other nations as well." Mayer, supra note 32, at 173. For more background on malaria and efforts to
treat the disease, see WHO, Malaria Fact Sheet No. 94 (revised Oct. 1998) (estimating over one mil-
lion deaths a year from malaria), at http://www.who.int. Of the estimated one million malaria
deaths per year, more than 90% of these deaths occur in Sub-Saharan Africa, and almost all are chil-
dren under five years of age. See World Bank Report, Malaria-At-A-Glance, (July 26,2001), available
at http'//mosquito.who.int/cmc-upload/0/000/014/813/malaria-at aglance I .htm.
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more expensive and in some cases less effective than DDT.'57 Many of these
alternative chemicals have undergone only limited efficacy testing, and may
have more acutely toxic effects than DDT, which is associated with reproductive
effects and long-term cancer risks.'58 These factors combined in the treaty nego-
tiations to produce contentious debate about the fate of DDT in the POPs Con-
vention. Despite accounts in the popular press, however, observers of the
negotiations indicate that the DDT issue was never framed in a black-and-
white, "to ban or not to ban" debate.'59
Prior to INC-1, the World Health Organization (WHO) had been asked to
participate in order to lend its significant public health expertise to the negotia-
tions.16° Interestingly, the way that the WHO's perspective evolved parallels the
way negotiations progressed on the issue of DDT. When the INC-3 talks began,
some participants recommended setting a phase-out date for DDT, in the context
of a larger set of actions to ensure that efforts to combat malaria were not hin-
dered.' 6' This move to ban DDT use was countered by representatives from de-
157. See Cowling, supra note 54, at 272; see also Donald R. Roberts, DDT Risk Assessments, 109
ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. A302 (2001) (arguing that lack of viable alternatives to DDT should come
as no surprise and that "global vilification of DDT eliminated almost all research on public health
insecticides"). Despite potential problems associated with ill effects from DDT use, the WHO
continues to recommend DDT for vector control in combating malaria. See Problems with Persis-
tent Organic Pollutants: Towards Better Alternatives, IFCS Experts Meeting on POPs (Manila, Phil.,
June 17-19, 1996), available at http'//www.chem.unep.ch/pops/indxhtms/ifcsall.html.
158. See Matthew P. Longnecker et al., DDT Use in U.S. Linked to Premature Births in the 1960's,
NIEHS Press Release, July 12, 2001, at http://www.niehs.nih.gov/oc/news/preddt.htm; see also
WEDO, Special Impacts of Persistent Organic Pollutants (POPs) on Women, available at http://
wedo.orgehealth/popsprimer (citing studies showing decreased lactation and increased risk of
breast cancer in women exposed to DDT). For a different take on research linking breast cancer
to DDT exposure, see Francine Laden et al., 1,]-Dichloro-2,2-bis(p-chlorophenyl)ethylene and
Polychlorinated Biphenyl and Breast Cancer: Combined Analysis of Five U.S. Studies, 93 J. NAT'L
CANCER INST. 768 (2001) (combining data from five large breast cancer studies and finding no link
to the pesticide DDT). Cf Pesticide Action Network North America, Study Shows Link Between
DDT and Early Puberty, II GLOBAL PESTICIDE CAMPAIGNER (2001), at http://panna.igc.org//
resources/gpc/gpc200l 12.11 .3.29.dv.html.
159. See Liroff E-mail, supra note 156; see also E-mail from Cynthia Palmer Olsen to Andrew
Yoder (Feb. 11,2002, 11:08 EST) (on file with author).
160. See Cowling, supra note 54, at 269.
161. See Lallas, supra note 10, at 133. The WWF, an international environmental NGO that par-
ticipated heavily in the negotiations leading up to Stockholm, initially called for an international
phase-out of DDT by 2007, "as a motivational tool." WWF, WWF's Efforts to Phase Out DDT, at
http://www.worldwildlife.org/toxics/progareas/pop/ddt.htm (last visited Feb. 13, 2003).
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veloping countries, who argued forcefully for DDT's continued use, at least until
alternatives become affordable. 6 2 These countries maintained that DDT's practi-
cal and economic effectiveness should exclude it from a complete ban, a perspec-
tive that was echoed by some public health officials as well.' 63 Amir Attaran, a
lecturer at the Harvard Center for International Development, argued that what
he perceived to be a campaign to ban DDT, mounted by hundreds of environmen-
tal groups, was premised on a naYve mandate to eliminate DDT altogether, with-
out regard for its beneficial applications."6 Attaran, along with health officials and
developing country representatives, emphasized the uncertain nature of much of
the science behind what participants knew of POPs' effects, arguing that it is not
good health policy to stop a known beneficial use based on uncertain harms.6 '
As the negotiations progressed, representatives from developed countries,
along with environmental and many public health NGOs from around the
world,'66 focused on the need for precaution in addressing DDT. From the start,
negotiators agreed on a ban on DDT for agricultural use, while some NGOs de-
bated its use for malaria control.'67 These and other public health and environ-
162. See Awounda,supra note 57 (quoting Mozambique's Minister for the Environment, stating,
"We cannot get rid of the DDT... overnight. It will take years."). African nations especially,
banded together and engaged extensively in the debate over DDT, submitting draft proposals that
are reflected in the final treaty. See Lallas,supra note 10, at 133-34.
163. See D.R. Roberts et al., DDT House Spraying and Re-Emerging Malaria, 356 LANCET 330
(2000), at http://www.thelancet.com (emphasizing DDT's extreme effectiveness and, thus, impor-
tance to countries battling malaria); see also Attaran et al.,supra note 155 (arguing that scientific lit-
erature supporting a DDT ban was unpersuasive and that the benefits of DDT in saving lives are
well worth its risks).
164. Amir Attaran & Rajendra Maharaj, DDT for Malaria Control Should Not be Banned, 321
BRIT. MED. J. 1403 (20 0 0),at http://www.bmj.com (highlighting the extreme effectiveness of DDT
at reducing incidence of global malaria and chiding environmental groups for their "stunningly
na've" crusade to prohibit the use of DDT).
165. Id.; see also, e.g., Roberts et al.,supra note 163, at 330-32.
166. See Attaran & Maharaj, supra note 164 ("The campaign to ban [DDTI joined by 260 envi-
ronmental groups reads like a who's who of the environmental movement and includes names
such as Greenpeace, Worldwide Fund for Nature (WWF), and (ironically) the Physicians for So-
cial Responsibility."). A coalition of environmental NGOs formed in 1998, calling itself the Inter-
national POPs Elimination network (IPEN); grew to embrace more than 300 NGOs, including
many from developing countries, by the end of negotiations. See IPEN-About IPEN, at http://
ipen.ecn.cz/index.php? k =about/ (last visited Feb. 13, 2003) [hereinafter About IPENJ.
167. See The DDT Question, 356 LANCET 1189 (2000) (particularly Richard A. Liroff's response to
D.R. Roberts on the malaria issue) Ihereinafter The DDT Question]. Among NGOs, the WWF
advocated a ban on DDT, but later retreated from this position. See supra notes 161-63 and
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mental groups were represented by IPEN, whose numbers had grown to over
240 member organizations by the end of INC-3.'68 IPEN also counted among its
ranks indigenous groups from developing countries across the globe, who added
their perspectives to the debate over DDT and the other POPs, At INC-3,
WWF shifted away from its phase-out language for DDT, but continued to em-
phasize alternative strategies for malaria control, including other types of chem-
ical insecticides and integrated vector management, 169 and urged clear
commitments to increased funding for malaria control. 7 ° Health experts related
recent knowledge on the process of endocrine disruption and expressed concern
over the effects of indoor spraying for mosquitoes-the primary method of em-
ploying DDT in combating malaria-but acknowledged DDT's apparent ef-
fectiveness and the lack of proven alternatives. 7' In the end, DDT's continued
accompanying text; see also Summary of the Third Session of the INC for An International Legally
Binding Instrument for Implementing International Action on Certain Persistent Organic Pollutants,
15 EARTH NEGOTIATIONS BULL. 1 (1999), available at http://www.iisd.caAinkages/voll5/
enbl527e.html. See generally RIsK VERSUS RISK: TRADEOFFS IN PROTECTING HEALTH AND THE ENVI-
RONMENT (John D. Graham & Jonathan Baert Wiener eds., 1995) (giving a thoughtful analysis of
the process of risk balancing).
168. IPEN INC-3 Report, supra note 153. IPEN would eventually grow to embrace more than
350 NGOs, including significant numbers from developing countries, by the end of negotiations.
See About IPEN, supra note 166.
169. UNEP defines Integrated Vector Management (IVM) as follows:
IVM delivers tailor-made, flexible solutions to local malaria problems, while reduc-
ing the use of insecticides whenever possible. IVM is based on clear decision-
making criteria and management procedures that ensure the best local mix of
alternative products and methods at any given time. It requires partnerships with
other public sectors, with the private sector and with civil society, and it is therefore
compatible with the basic principles of WHO's Roll Back Malaria initiative.
UNEP, Progress Report on the Development of a WHO Action Plan for the Reduction of Reliance of
DDT Use for Public Health Purposes, at http://www.pops.int/documents/meetings/inc3/inf-
english/inf3-15/ infl5.pdf.
170. See WWF, Resolving the DDT Dilemma: Protecting Biodiversity and Human Health, pt. D
(1998), available at http'//www.worldwildlife.org/toxics/pubres/ddt l.pdf (offering a framework to
guide malaria control programs toward reduced reliance on all pesticides). The WWF dropped
its discussion of a ban by 2007 in order to "allay fears" that DDT would be phased out without suf-
ficient guarantees of protection against malaria. WWF's Efforts to Phase Out DDT, supra note 161.
17 1. See Richard A. Liroff, Reduction and Elimination of DDT should Proceed Slowly, 321 BRIT.
MED. J. 1403, 1405 (2000), available at http://www.bmj.com/cgi/content/full/321/7273/1403#resp2
(warning of house spraying's effects and suggesting that the POPs treaty "raises a series of equity
challenges that must be addressed directly").
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effectiveness and uncertainty about the universal availability of effective, afford-
able alternatives to DDT shifted the focus away from a DDT ban towards com-
bating malaria through other means.'72
While there was some dispute over the elimination issue with regard to
DDT, there was considerably more consensus about what to do with the other
POPs identified by UNEP. Based on the high degrees of persistence and toxicity
of those POPs, scientists were in general agreement about the rest of UNEP's
"dirty dozen," which include seven other intentionally produced pesticides,
dioxins, PCBs and furans' 73 These compounds have been associated with a wide
range of health effects, none of which is balanced by public health applications
similar to those of DDT.'74 Worse, many of the other pesticide POPs are signifi-
cantly more toxic than DDT.'75 In fact, the other pesticide POPs remained in use
only because of their availability and relatively low prices, which make them
viable options to cash-strapped developing countries.76 As a result, negotiators
agreed without significant debate about the fate of most of these compounds. By
the end of INC-3, parties had reached a preliminary agreement to eliminate pro-
duction and use of the pesticides aldrin, endrin and toxaphene, for which none
of the countries indicated an intention to claim an exemption,' and to phase out
chlordane, dieldrin, heptachlor, mirex and hexachlorobenzene with exemptions
for certain countries. 17
8
Industry representatives continued to speak in favor of continued use of
PCBs, arguing that the likely excessive costs of replacing equipment, as well as the
PCBs' stability and fire-resistant nature, made them the perfect industrial chem-
ical. 79 Concerns of cost alone, however, are insufficient to sustain a challenge to
172. See, e.g., WWF's Efforts to Phase Out DDT supra note 161.
173. See McGinn,supra note 3, at 80 (providing a table illustrating POPs' persistence and toxicity
in relation to other types of pollutants).
174. See supra text accompanying notes 22-50;see also ALLSOPP ET AL., supra note 21, at 5, Box 1.3
(discussing toxic effects of POPs).
175. See A.G. Smith, How Toxic Is DDT?, 356 LANCET 267 (2000) (discussing DDT's toxicity and
comparing it to dieldrin, which is thought to be three times more acutely toxic than DDT).
176. These low prices of pesticide POPs are probably due to the fact that the patents on them
have expired, allowing cheaper competitors to drive prices down. See Cowling, supra note 54, at
272-73.
177. See WWFsupra note 150.
178. Id.
179. See Lauren MacLanahan, Polychlorinated Biphenyls and the "Mega Rule"-Will it Have the
Mega-Impact the EPA Desired?, 24 W. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'y REv. 345, 346 (2000) (discussing
PCB's characteristics in the context of the U.S. TSCA legislation).
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regulation of compounds, such as PCBs that are considered highly toxic, are prob-
able human carcinogens, and lead to numerous reproductive and other health
problems. 8 ° Aside from the DDT issue, a comparison of the risks of further expo-
sure to POPs and the risks of banning their use supports elimination. 8 In the end,
no compelling arguments were made for the continued use of the other chemicals,
and a comparison of their costs and benefits weighed heavily in favor of phase-
outs or complete bans.
82
Near the end of INC-3, while many issues had been resolved, great tension
remained over other issues, including how to provide technical and financial as-
sistance and the extent to which the precautionary principle should be employed
in adding new chemicals to the treaty in the future. 83 In an attempt to establish
consensus on the latter issue, a group of experts proposed scientific criteria for
adding chemicals to the agreement during the meetings in June and September
1999, using toxicity and capability for long-range transport as principal crite-
ria.1 84 However, various delegations, most notably the Australian and EU dele-
gates, disagreed about these provisions.'85 The European Union favored
provisions that would make it easier to add new chemicals, even if there were
uncertainties about their adverse effects.'86 On the other hand, the Australian
delegation, which appears to have been joined by the U.S. and Canadian delega-
tions and industry representatives, favored an approach involving more steps to
adding further chemicals, with no reference to a precautionary principle in the
Convention.' 87 However, statements made later by the U.S. delegation indicat-
180. See HARTE ET AL.,supra note 6, at 382-84;see also AARON WILDAVSKY, BUT Is IT TRUE? A CIT-
IZENS GUIDE TO ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH AND SAFETY ISSUES (1995).
181. For background on comparative risk assessment, including pitfalls and potential solutions,
see generally Adam M. Finkel, Comparing Risks Thoughtfully, 7 RISK: HEALTH, SAFETY & ENV'T
325 (1996).
182. See The DDT Question, supra note 167 (advocating a risk-benefit approach).
183. IPEN INC-3 Report, supra note 153. Other than dioxin and DDT, the international com-
munity was generally in consensus about the other POPs, for which there was not the same con-
tinuing need. The inclusion of a "precautionary principle" would prove to be a particularly
challenging issue facing negotiators at INC-4 in Bonn, Germany. See IPEN, Press Release, Global
Treaty on Toxic Chemicals Moving Too Slowly with Too Many Divisions, at http://www.ipen.org
[hereinafter IPEN INC-4 Press Release].
184. See Mayer, supra note 32, at 176.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 176-77.
187. Greenpeace Toxics Campaign, Stockholm Convention-Australia: The Bad Guys, at http://
archive.greenpeace.org.
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ing that the concept of precaution "fully informs this treaty" call this character-
ization into question.188 Regardless, the question of precaution in the addition of
new chemicals would remain contentious through the end of negotiations in
Johannesburg the following year.
At the close of negotiations in INC-3, some deliberation still focused on
what to do about DDT, and whether its extensive use in malaria mosquito con-
trol could be replaced with effective alternatives.' But much of the debate that
remained was over even more divisive issues that would play themselves out in
later negotiations."'
D. Deep-Seated Divisions in Bonn
These issues arose in earnest at the fourth INC session (INC-4), which was
held March 20-25, 2000, in Bonn, Germany. 9' During INC-4, many partici-
pants shared the perspective that divisions in the negotiations over funding com-
mitments and other issues threatened future progress. 192 IPEN and member
organizations identified several other key disputes, including language on elim-
ination and application of the precautionary principle, and were fearful that dis-
sension among parties would threaten the outcome of the negotiations.'93 Clifton
Curtis, Director of WWF's Global Toxics Programme, articulated a fear among
NGOs that many delegates were "trying to evade their responsibilities as mem-
bers of the global community" and that the treaty was "being buried under a
blanket of arcane language and loopholes."' 19 4 Public health officials from
around the world also weighed in on the negotiations, accusing the U.S. delega-
tion of taking an unacceptably weak position, particularly on the elimination
question and issues relating to funding and technical assistance for developing
188. U.S. POPs Statement, supra note 144.
189. See IPEN, National Toxics Network Meeting (1999), at http://www.ipen.org/inc3ntn.html.
190. See Liroff E-mail, supra note 154.
191. WWF, supra note 150; see also UNEP Persistent Organic Pollutants, at http://irptc.unep.ch/
pops.
192. See IPEN INC-4 Press Release, supra note 183.
193. See id. (warning that if disputed issues were not resolved, the result would be "a treaty that
is not worth the paper it is written on").
194. Id.
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countries.'95 Romeo Quijano, M.D., of the Pesticide Action Network of the
Philippines, put it bluntly: "It is time to put the money on the table and decide
how to get crucial assistance to the developing countries.... Financial and tech-
nical assistance must be recognized as an obligation and not just a handout."'' 96
As they had begun to in earlier INC meetings, negotiators also differed over
how to include a precautionary principle with respect to chemicals to be added
to the regime after its entry into force.'9 7 Indeed, negotiations over precaution
and the elaboration of Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration'" proved to be one of
the most contentious issues addressed at these meetings. 99 Many environmental
group participants stressed the need to enshrine the "precautionary principle" in
international environmental law, focusing on verified effects in animals and the
potential for negative health effects in humans."0 Some public health figures,
however, argued that NGOs were employing the precautionary principle to the
detriment of Third World health, and questioned the motives of groups that
would put the health of people in poor countries "at a very real risk to protect cit-
izens of wealthier nations from a theoretical risk." '' As they had at previous
INC sessions, state delegations also differed in their positions on this issue. The
European delegates favored extensive, repeated references to precaution and the
"precautionary principle" in the actual text of the treaty.20 2 Other state delega-
tions, including those of the United States, Australia and Canada, favored a risk-
assessment approach with more proof of causality with regard to listing of new
195. See Environmental Media Services, Public Health Experts Call on Clinton-Gore Administra-
tion to Improve Weak U.S. Stance at Treaty Talks on Toxins, Mar. 20, 2000, at http://www.ems.org/
pops/ zz.ems.00.03.20.html (quoting Dr. Peter Orris, University of Illinois Professor of environ-
mental and occupational health sciences, as saying that the Clinton Administration's "weak" and
"confused" position was "remarkably similar" to chemical industry positions on these issues).
196. IPEN INC-4 Press Release, supra note 183.
197. See The DDT Question, supra note 167, at 1189-98 (showing different perspectives on the
precautionary principle in the POPs negotiations); see also Mayer,supra note 32, at 159-79; see also
McGi NN, supra note 35 (providing an argument that environmental law should reflect a precau-
tionary approach).
198. See Rio Declaration, supra note 90, princ. 15.
199. See Gilbert M. Bankobeza et al., Environmental Law, 35 INT'L LAW. 659, 666 (2001).
200. See IPEN, POPs: The Birth of a Public Health Treaty (2000) (arguing that throughout the
negotiations, a precautionary approach to POPs was vital), at http://www.ipen.org/treaty02.html.
201. Anonymous Editorial, Caution Required with the Precautionary Principle, 356 LANCET 265
(2000).
202. Bankobeza et al., supra note 199, at 667.
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chemicals." 3 Despite their efforts, negotiators were once again unable to resolve
this issue in the context of INC-4, and the extent to which precaution should be
employed in adding new chemicals to the Convention would occupy negotiators
in Johannesburg until the final hours of the fifth INC session (INC-5).
By the end of INC-4, however, most of the delegations had reached funda-
mental agreement on a majority of the issues confronted in the INC sessions.
They had expressed their commitment to elimination of non-DDT POPs,
embraced at least one version of the precautionary approach, and agreed on con-
fronting the tough issues POPs regulation posed to the global community-
even if they had not solved them yet.2"
E. Building Consensus (or Buying Compromise) in Johannesburg
As the debates progressed at INC5,2 °' and more views were shared, groups
and delegations worked to establish treaty language that would be universally
acceptable.2"6 On the issue of adding further chemicals to the treaty, the United
States and the European Union, in debates that were watched by the media and
policymakers across the world, still disagreed about the application of the pre-
cautionary principle to the addition of new chemicals to the Convention. 20 7
Throughout the entire process, the European Union had proved more progres-
sive and precautionary in its negotiating positions than did the United States.
20 8
In the final negotiating sessions, the EU delegation proposed that the process of
information-gathering should begin as candidate chemicals are identified,
203. See id.
204. See IPEN, Table, National Government Commitments on Elimination and on the Precautionary
Principle (Mar. 25, 2000), at http'//www.ipen.org/matrix.html [hereinafter IPEN table].
205. Held in Johannesburg December 4-9,2000, INC-5 was a crucial turning point in the POPs
negotiations, with delegates recognizing the need to agree on concrete language and reach com-
promise on important parts of the treaty provisions.
206. See IPEN table, supra note 204 (indicating a majority of state delegations were in favor of
eliminating most POPs and enshrining the precautionary principle); see also Lallas,supra note 10,
at 133.
207. See Vanessa Houlder, Deal in Sight over Toxic Chemicals Treaty: African Exemptions for
Malaria ControlAreAdding to Tensions at Johannesburg Meeting, FIN. TIMES (London), Dec. 7,2000,
at 15.
208. UN Conference Approves POPs Convention in Stockholm, OURSTOLENFuTuRE.ORG (describ-
ing European and U.S. divergences on several issues), at http://www.ourstolenfuture.org/policy/
pops/2001-0522popsconvention.htm (last visited Feb. 13, 2003).
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hoping to speed up the process of listing new POPs to regulate under the
auspices of the Convention."° The U.S. proposal-which was advocated by the
G-77 nations after strong U.S. lobbying behind the scenes-alarmed some ob-
servers of the negotiations, who warned that under this procedure, it was un-
likely that new chemicals would be included formally and thus earmarked for
bans for at least a decade."' Negotiators finally agreed to this proposal, adopting
provisions to add new chemicals that resemble the risk-assessment approach ad-
vocated throughout by industry and the U.S. and Australian delegations. 21 1 In
this way, application of precautionary language relating to the addition of new
chemicals to the Convention was the product of careful compromises reached
over the course of long negotiations. 212 In the end, the final version of the Stock-
holm Convention includes several references to the precautionary principle in
the preamble, objectives, and provisions concerning review and listing of addi-
tional chemicals.2 13 Since it applies the precautionary principle to toxic chemical
management in international law, the Stockholm treaty represents an important
milestone in international environmental law. 2 4
Even with progress on divisive questions related to DDT and the precaution-
ary principle, negotiating parties at INC-5 faced daunting issues of financial and
technical assistance that had yet to be resolved. Throughout the process, it was
clear that POPs were of greater concern to developed countries, despite the risks
POPs posed to developing countries. 215 For this reason, most of the participants
209. Id.
210. Id. This fear was not shared by many participants, however, and there is significant evidence
of will to move forward with the addition of new chemicals once the treaty enters into force. See
Resolutions Adopted by the Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Stockholm Convention on
Persistent Organic Pollutants, 11.8, available at http://www.pops.int/documents/implementation/
resolution/default.htm.
211. Bankobeza et al.,supra note 199, at 666; see also Written Testimony of Michael Walls, for the
American Chemistry Council Before the Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works
on the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants (May 9, 2002), available at http:/
www.senate.gov/ -epw/walls051402.htm.
212. Testimony of Brooks Yeager, Vice President for Global Threats, WWF, Before the Comm.
on Environment and Public Works, U.S. Senate 4-6 (May 9, 2002), at http://www.worldwild-
life.org [hereinafter Testimony of Brooks Yeager].
213. Bankobeza et al.,supra note 199, at 666.
214. McGinn, supra note 3, at 76.
215. Delegates from these countries, while acknowledging POPs' risks for the developing world,
noted that the risks paled in comparison to those posed by poverty, AIDS and other, more imme-
diate threats to health and security. Bankobeza et al.,supra note 199, at 667.
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understood that funding commitments were essential to secure the participation
of poorer countries. Not all developed countries shared this view, however. In-
deed, the EU delegation initially opposed funding commitments, arguing against
trading funds for compliance.216 Most delegations expressed concern not about
whether to provide technical assistance or to which states it would be distributed,
but about the level and the method by which it would be administered.217 Among
these parties, the real debate related to the suitability of the Global Environmental
Facility (GEF), over which many countries expressed unease.218 In the end, as part
of a political compromise, the GEF was chosen as an interim agency to coordinate
financial and technical assistance, with the Conference of the Parties agreeing to
revisit the effectiveness of the institution at its first meeting.
21 9
During the week of June 17 to 21, 2002, parties met in Geneva for the sixth
INC session (INC-6), which was designed to coordinate efforts to implement
the Stockholm Convention, signed in Stockholm in May 200 1.22' During this set
of meetings, the groundwork was laid for execution of the various provisions of
the Convention, including, the review process for specific exemptions, guidance
on a number of technical issues, and procedures for reviewing the GEF (the in-
terim funding and technical assistance facility).221 INC-6 marked the end of the
negotiation phase and the beginning of the implementation phase for the new
POPs Convention, with delegates working together with a renewed purpose to
implement the provisions of the treaty as soon as possible.
222
216. See E-mail from Morag Carter, IPEN coordinator, to Andrew J. Yoder (Feb. 18, 2002, 12:30
EST) (on file with author).
217. Id.; Testimony of Brooks Yeager, supra note 212, at 5.
218. IPEN website, supra note 129;see also Testimony of Brooks Yeager, supra note 212, at 5.
219. Stockholm Convention, supra note 1, art. 14; accord Testimony of Brooks Yeager, supra note
212.
220. UNEP, Report of the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee for an International Legally
Binding Instrument for Implementing International Action on Certain Persistent Organic Pollutants on
the Work of its Sixth Session, at http://www.chem.unep.ch/sc/documents/meetings/inc6/en/
meetdocen.htm.
221. See POPs INC-6 Meeting Documents (providing a complete list of topics at the INC-6 meet-
ings), available at http://www.chem.unep.ch/sc/documents/meetings/inc6/en/meetdocen.htm.
222. UNEP, supra note 220.
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IV. DRAWING LESSONS FROM THE STOCKHOLM EXPERIENCE
Participants in the POPs negotiations reached compromise in the final hours
of the negotiations in Johannesburg,22 creating a treaty regime that promises to be
the most effective multilateral environmental treaty of the new decade.224 Indeed,
despite the divergent perspectives on POPs witnessed in the context of the nego-
tiations, the final agreement has been accepted and praised by governmental and
public health officials, policymakers, and representatives from both environmen-
tal groups and the chemical industry.225 This broad consensus is as rare in interna-
tional environmental law as it is encouraging. Analysis of the broadly accepted
regime that negotiators were able to achieve in the Stockholm Convention yields
lessons for future MEAs. Whether or not these lessons apply perfectly in other
issue contexts, the experience of the POPs Convention illustrates the progress that
can be made on global environmental problems.
A. Limits on Effectiveness and Applicability of POPs Convention
Despite initially positive indications from state parties involved in the nego-
tiations, it is possible that the Stockholm Convention will be less than a complete
success. Effective implementation may be circumscribed by shortcomings in rat-
ifying states. The Convention requires that fifty states ratify the treaty before it
enters into force, which may prevent meaningful progress from occurring for
223. Mariann Lloyd-Smith, Coordinator, National Toxics Network Inc., Letter Written upon
Completion of Negotiations, Dec. 10, 2000, at http://www.ipen.org/treaty0l.
224. McGinn,supra note 3, 75-76 (calling the Stockholm Convention one of the "main environ-
mental achievements" since the 1992 Rio Conference and an "important milestone in interna-
tional environmental law").
225. See id.; see also IPEN, supra note 200 (calling the Stockholm Convention a "strong treaty");
WWF, supra note 150 ("The treaty provisions appropriately balance [competing needs]."); Michael
P. Walls, Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants (POPs), Presentation at the Glo-
bal Chemical Regulations Conference: Living with TSCA and International Chemical Controls (Mar.
14, 2001) (describing the "generally satisfactory outcome"); President George W. Bush, Remarks
by the President, Secretary of State Colin Powell and EPA Administrator Christine Todd Whit-
man, Address at the Rose Garden press conference (Apr. 19, 2001) (praising the treaty as "the way
environmental policy should work").
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several years, while countries debate the treaty's language and requirements.226
In the U.S. context, this process is not open-and-shut, despite early indications of
support from the current Bush Administration and signature by EPA Adminis-
trator Christie Whitman.227 Since official U.S. participation in the treaty
requires Senate ratification, the U.S. role in POPs treaty implementation will
depend on the language that the legislature eventually approves.
On April 11,2002, Administrator Whitman announced that President Bush
was submitting the Stockholm Convention to the Senate for advice and consent
to ratification, beginning the process of legislative review of the treaty.22 Upon
reviewing the implementing legislation, however, environmental groups ex-
pressed concern that the legislation failed to address the addition of new chemi-
cals to the treaty.229 In remarks to House Speaker Dennis Hastert, Administrator
Whitman responded by indicating that the legislation included a "science-based
procedure for the international community to add new chemicals in the future"
and asserted that the "details related to implementation of the specific criteria [to
add new chemicals] are still under development. "230
At the time of this writing, two distinct Congressional areas of action are
needed to enact the POPs Convention for the United States: funding and final im-
226. See Joel A. Mintz, Two Cheers for Global POPs: A Summary and Assessment of the Stockholm
Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants, 14 GEo. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 319, 331 (2001). Recent
ratifications by several parties may belie this assumption, however, and underscore the ways in
which the POPs convention is unique. See Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollut-
ants Homepage, at http://www.pops.int/.
227. "I'm pleased to announce my support for the [POPs] treaty and the intention of our govern-
ment to sign and submit it for approval by the United States Senate." President George W. Bush,
Remarks Regarding the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants (Apr. 19, 2001),
available at http://www.state.gov/ secretary/rm/2001/2356.htm. "The Bush Administration
strongly supports the POPs Treaty." EPA, Fact Sheet on POPs (Sept. 2001); see also EPA & Dept. of
State, Press Statement, U.S. Signs Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants (May 23, 2001), at
http://yosemite.epa.gov.
228. See EPA, Press Release, President Bush Sends the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic
Pollutants to Senate for Ratification; Submits Legislation to Congress to Implement Treaty (Apr. 11,
2002), at http://yosemite.epa.gov.
229. See WWF, Press Release, WWF Applauds Bush Decision to Send Chemical Treaty Package to
the Hill, But Legislative Deficiencies Must Be Fixed by Congress (Apr. 10 2002), at http://
www.worldwildlife.org/ toxics/whatsnew/pr_26.htm.
230. Letter from Christine Todd Whitman, EPA Administer, to Speaker Dennis Hastert (on file
with author), at http'//www.epa.gov/oppfead I/cb/csbpage/updates/popsletters.htm (last updated
Apr. 11,2002).
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plementing legislation.23' In order to fund the interim financial mechanism for the
POPs Convention, the Bush Administration in early August, 2002, pledged over
$500 million to the GEF over four years to ensure that the GEF's other duties are
not neglected while it implements the POPs Treaty.23 2 Along with those of thirty-
one other countries, the United States' contribution to the GEF will fund the
GEF's operations through June 2006, allowing it to continue its important work
on biodiversity, climate change, and ozone-depleting substances, while providing
additional funds to integrate its new functions under the POPs Convention. 233
To ensure complete participation by the United States, the Senate must act
on the implementing legislation-including the Administration's bill and the
Chairman's bill, S.2118-in order to implement the provisions for adding new
chemicals agreed upon by negotiators at INC-5.234 In so doing, however, the Sen-
ate must work out differences between S.2118 and the Administration's version
of the implementing legislation, which left out the provisions for adding new
chemicals, envisioning a case-by-case revision of domestic legislation each time a
POP was considered for addition to the Convention.235 This hurdle to future im-
plementation of the Treaty must be addressed and removed by the Senate before
effective implementation of the Stockholm Convention can take place. Without
these changes to the Administration's proposed legislation, U.S. participation in
the Convention is threatened, as is its credibility among other nations in the in-
ternational regulation of POPs. 236
Weaknesses in the Convention text could also inhibit its implementation.
One such weakness lies in the POPs Treaty's cost-recognizing provisions, which
in some cases could prevent best available technology from being employed. 237
The terms of the Convention are also vague on enforcement issues, which could
231. Testimony of Brooks Yeager, supra note 212, at 7.
232. Eryn Gable, Nations Agree to $3B Enviro Fund Replenishment, GREENWIRE, Aug. 8, 2002, at
http://www.eenews.net/greenwire.
233. See id.
234. See Testimony of Brooks Yeager, supra note 212.
235. See id. (describing alternative ways that new POPs can be regulated under existing U.S.
laws).
236. See id.
237. See Mintz, supra note 226, at 331 (citing Stockholm Convention, supra note 1, Annex C, pt.
V(B)). The language to this effect is ambiguous, however, and should be read merely to advocate
cost-benefit analysis; as such, it does not seem to pose much of a threat to effective implementa-
tion, given other provisions in the text and the generally precautionary nature of the treaty. See
Stockholm Convention, supra note 1, art. 1.
EVALUATING THE GLOBAL CONVENTION ON POPs
lead to ineffectual treaty enforcement mechanisms.23 As discussed below, how-
ever, unique features of the states and industries most affected by this treaty will
likely mitigate this potential weakness and result in relatively strong enforce-
ment. A final place in which the POPs Convention may lack detail is in a track-
ing system to prevent illegal trade in banned pesticides. Again, this concern, if
realized, is likely to pose only a minor impediment to effective operation of the
treaty regime, since significant incentives for implementation exist.
It may be difficult for other reasons to derive lessons for negotiating future
international environmental treaties from the successes of the POPs experience.
One reason that the parties were able to reach agreement may have been the par-
ticular circumstances of the parties, the global economy, and the fact that substi-
tutes for many POPs are available. In this way, the Stockholm Convention may
be similar to the Montreal Protocol, which was able to garner near-complete
consensus due to a number of peculiarities. The Montreal Protocol was able to
achieve its relative success due to the particular characteristics of the issue, the
parties, and the presence of such widespread support for regulating CFCs. 239
Further, as with POPs, the chemicals of concern in the Montreal Protocol,
CFCs, were produced by humans, and their uses were widespread, but circum-
scribed. 24' The potentially affected industries were also generally proponents of
regulation, since they were creating substitute products, and they would benefit
from the increased demand for them.24'
The POPs context is similar. While their uses are also widespread, POPs
have specific applications in industry and agriculture. As in the development of
the Montreal Protocol, industry was not antagonistic in the POPs context, osten-
sibly motivated by prospects of marketing and selling more costly substitutes to
the banned pesticides. Though these factors may prevent the experience from
translating broadly into regimes crafted to deal with other types of environmen-
tal problems, they do appear promising for the successful implementation of the
POPs Convention.
Despite the singularity of many components of the POPs process, several
factors may apply broadly to future multinational environmental treaty negoti-
238. See Mintz, supra note 226, at 332.
239. See DeSombre, supra note 93, at 52 (explaining how "remarkably particular" characteristics
made the Montreal Protocol possible and may also constrain its applicability to other situations).
240. See id.
241. Seeid. at 57 -58.
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ation. One early lesson is that each stage of a treaty is important, and the way that
the treaty progresses from initial meeting to the signing of the final document is
of fundamental importance in determining its outcome.242 Throughout negotia-
tions, extensive participation-by representatives of governments, NGOs, and
affected industry--can make all the difference in MEAs. It is also important to
maintain this involvement throughout negotiations by taking account of states'
limitations and accounting for them through creative provisions. Finally, a fo-
cused legal mandate is also needed to keep the treaty negotiation process on
track, creating a direction to guide participants.
B. Encouraging Participation-A Way to Success
The lessons that can be drawn from Stockholm begin with the way that the
treaty developed, even before the substantive negotiations began. Several novel
features of the Convention allowed a broad range of perspectives to be repre-
sented at the negotiating table. Early on, UNEP recognized the many limita-
tions to participation in international treaty regimes on the part of developing
countries and took steps to overcome these obstacles. Not the least of these in-
volves the expense of fielding teams of negotiators, especially from the smallest
and poorest developing countries, whose priorities often involve concerns that
are more basic."' UNEP addressed these concerns by providing funding to en-
able officials from developing countries to attend negotiation sessions and pre-
paratory and informational meetings around the world. UNEP also scheduled
regional workshops with the same goals in mind, holding two of the five INC
sessions in Africa, and one of the two meetings of the Criteria Experts Group in
Thailand.244 These actions helped negotiators recognize the perspectives and
balance the needs of both developed and developing countries. As illustrated in
the DDT context, negotiators balanced the need to reduce pesticide use against
the need to protect populations from malaria, and were able to reach a compro-
mise that promises to be workable when implemented.
242. Cf. Lallas, supra note 10, at 150.
243. See Montevideo Programme II: The Programme for the Development and Periodic Review
of Environmental Law for the 1990s, UNEP Dec. 17/25 (May 21, 1993), at httpi/www.unep.org/
newlaw/ montevideo%20programme%20ii.doc.
244. Lallas, supra note 10, at 140.
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The POPs negotiations are seen as successful because of the way that they in-
tegrated NGOs into the negotiation process.24 The international community also
sought to facilitate NGO participation by establishing the "POPs Club," an inno-
vative concept designed to ensure that as many voices as possible were heard
throughout the negotiations.24 6 The POPs Club set up a fund, combining over five
million dollars in donations from governments, intergovernmental organizations
(IGOs), and NGOs to facilitate meetings among delegates.247 IPEN also worked
to leverage resources to bring NGOs from around the world to the sessions. By en-
suring participation in initial meetings through these mechanisms, the interna-
tional community was able to encourage significant attendance and participation
in the various INC negotiating sessions. As a result, developing countries' per-
spectives remained at the forefront to an extent not often seen in MEA negotia-
tions. The result of this increased acknowledgement of Southern perspectives is a
regime that strikes a balance between competing needs in a new way.
C. Crafting Practical Provisions
The fundamental lesson to be learned is that MEA's provisions need to com-
pel participation, not prevent it. The Stockholm Convention's substantive provi-
sions address the need to ensure participation.248 Just as UNEP employed fresh
techniques to encourage participation at the negotiation stage, the POPs treaty,
as finalized at INC-5 in December 2000, includes features that enhance the abil-
ities of developing nations to comply with treaty requirements.249 The Conven-
tion includes mechanisms to assist less developed nations that are likely to
further effective implementation of the agreement. The most significant of these
involve financial assistance provisions, in which developed country parties
pledge to provide "new and additional financial resources" to developing
countries implementing the Convention.25 Indeed, the Convention makes
245. Indeed at the end of the last meeting, John Buccini, chair of the negotiations, identified
NGO participation as "one of the hallmarks of the entire process." Id. at 118; see also IPEN web-
site, supra note 129.
246. See UNEP, The POPs Club: An Innovative Financing Mechanism Helping to Bring About a
Global Treaty (2001), at http://irptc.unep.ch/pops/pops-club/pops-club.htm.
247. Id.
248. The rest of the substantive provisions are discussed in Mintz, supra note 226, at 326. (provid-
ing a summary of the Stockholm Convention's provisions and a brief assessment of its utility).
249. Id.
250. Stockholm Convention, supra note I, art. 13(2).
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developing countries' implementation of their commitments under the agree-
ment contingent upon the provision of financial assistance by developed coun-
tries.25' In this way, the Stockholm Convention utilizes a modern technique in
international environmental law, creating a legal relationship between the obli-
gations of developing countries and the financial obligations of developed
countries, and including unequivocal language to this effect.252 In a controversial
decision, the negotiators determined that the GE, which provides financial
support to remedy ecological problems, would provide interim operation of the
financial arrangements, which they specified in article 13.253 The Convention in-
cludes provisions to "cooperate to provide timely and appropriate technical as-
sistance to developing country Parties ... ,"254 a function the GEF will also
undertake. In the future, it is likely that most MEAs will require technical and
financial assistance provisions in order to secure the participation of the world's
less developed countries.
A more general and intuitive observation of the POPs negotiations is that
the goals of the treaty regime need to be constructed in terms that make sense to
the parties negotiating them. For this reason, complete bans of chemicals in
some contexts can be counterproductive. This reasoning applies to DDT in the
POPs context, because of its ongoing utility in combating malaria; only after
parties agreed to ongoing use of DDT for vector control could negotiations pro-
ceed. In its final form, the POPs treaty calls for general elimination of DDT pro-
duction and use, but provides for country-specific exemptions for vector
control.25 5 Parties wishing to continue using DDT for vector control are re-
quired to do in accordance with WHO recommendations and guidelines and
only "when locally safe, effective, and affordable alternatives are not available to
the Party in question." '256 To ensure oversight, reserving parties must submit
periodic reports about their use, explore substitute methods, and periodically
evaluate the continued need to employ DDT.2 57 Significantly, however, the Con-
251. Id. at art. 13(4).
252. This technique is employed in the Global Convention on Biodiversity, adopted May 22, 1992,
in force December 29,1993, which made conservation duties contingent upon "new and additional
financial resources." Kiss & SHELTON,SUpra note 97, at 308-09.
253. Stockholm Convention, supra note 1, at art. 14.
254. Id. at art. 12(2).
255. Id. at Annex B, pt. 11(l)-(4).
256. Id. at Annex B, pt. 11(2).
257. Id. at Annex B, p. 11(5).
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vention does not include a specific phase-out date for DDT, a provision over
which considerable debate took place.25 As the experience of the POPs Conven-
tion has illustrated, however, complete bans can and do make sense in the right
context, when appropriate factors are taken into consideration.
Still other lessons can be taken from the form of the treaty itself. It is impor-
tant to commence MEA negotiations with a focused objective. The way that ne-
gotiators developed and carried out a strong legal mandate on POPs holds
lessons for future MEAs. By limiting the initial focus to a specific set of "dirty"
chemicals, the Stockholm Convention acknowledges the constraints in circum-
scribing the use of chemicals and focuses its provisions in an in-depth manner,
purposely "going deep" in the way it addressed these twelve chemicals, instead
of developing a broader toxics treaty.2" 9 In this way, negotiators avoided the
sometimes problematic framework-protocol approach, often employed in inter-
national environmental treaties in order to achieve initial consensus on regula-
tory prerogatives. Once the framework is established, parties negotiate specific
protocols on various aspects of the larger problem. This approach has received
criticism for failing to secure effective participation, particularly in the notable
example of the Kyoto Protocol." By incorporating the precautionary principle
and empowering institutions to review the regime's progress, the Stockholm
Convention ensures that other chemicals will be added to the initial "dirty
dozen," but established clear terms and concrete duties with regard to the first
twelve POPs. The Convention also institutionalizes performance by organizing
a Conference of the Parties to oversee ongoing issues related to implementation.
D. POPs and the Future
In light of these provisions, it is not surprising that the final agreement was
able to secure strong initial support from nearly 120 states, and now claims over
150 signatories.26" ' As always, the proof will be in the pudding: the true success of
258. Lallas, supra note 10, at 133.
259. Id at 143.
260. See Nanda, supra note 120, at 321.
261. POPs Convention Homepage, List of Signatories and Parties to the Stockholm Convention of
2001, May 22, 2001, at http://www.pops.int/documents/signature/signstatus.htm; see also WWF
Toxic Chemical Initiative, Global Chemical Conventions: Ratifications, at http://archive.panda.org/
toxics/ratify/ (last visited Feb. 13, 2003).
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the Convention will be determined by how effectively parties implement the
provisions. As is clear from the Bush Administration's incomplete legislative
proposal to implement the treaty in the United States, there are many reasons to
be tentative in predicting the ultimate success of the global POPs treaty. The in-
ternational chemical industry, which opposed strong language throughout the
process, now lauds the treaty as an important step in cleaning up the global en-
vironment. 262 This gives one pause to consider how effective the treaty will be at
reducing the earth's toxics burden generally. In addition, broad support for the
treaty could be due in part to loopholes in the convention's language, which
could prevent effective enforcement.
The significant promise, however, that the treaty presents for the reduction
of POPs, and the tremendous will to move forward experienced at the signing in
Stockholm, bode well for the future of this convention. Of course, the fate of the
treaty will depend upon solid domestic implementation, which in turn will re-
quire the continued and increased monitoring that brought many of these issues
to bear in the first instance. Recalling the significant public support for and rec-
ognition of the need to regulate POPs effectively, this monitoring will probably
occur. The likely result is an effective global regime on an especially pernicious
set of toxic chemicals. The broad support from nearly all sectors working on the
POPs Convention encourages optimism about the future of international POPs
control. Further, the lessons that policymakers and others can draw from the ex-
perience are many, and implementing these in future MEAs is likely to result in
more successful environmental accords overall.
262. See, e.g., Walls, supra note 225.
